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Erie Insurance Confirms Cyberattack Behind Ongoing Outages; Customer Portals, Claims Processing Disrupted

Erie Insurance cyberattack (June 7) causes portal outages & claims disruption. Investigation ongoing. Urgent scam alert: ERIE won't call for payments. Details.

12-Jun-2025
5 min read

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RCE

APEX ONE

Critical pre-auth RCE & auth bypass flaws in Trend Micro Apex Central & PolicySe...

Trend Micro recently patched multiple critical-severity vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-49212 to CVE-2025-49220) in its Apex Central and Endpoint Encryption (TMEE) PolicyServer products. All flaws enable pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) or authentication bypass, fundamentally compromising the security posture of these enterprise management platforms. The root cause analysis reveals a pervasive pattern of insecure deserialization practices and broken authentication mechanisms, granting attackers SYSTEM (PolicyServer) or NETWORK SERVICE (Apex Central) privileges. With no evidence of active exploitation but lacking viable workarounds, immediate patching to PolicyServer v6.0.0.4013 and Apex Central Patch B7007 is operationally imperative. ### **Target Environment & Criticality** Trend Micro Endpoint Encryption (TMEE) PolicyServer and Apex Central serve as central nervous systems for enterprise security operations: * **TMEE PolicyServer:** Manages full-disk and removable media encryption for Windows endpoints in regulated industries (finance, healthcare, government). It is a high-value target because it enforces data protection compliance (e.g., HIPAA, GDPR, PCI-DSS). * **Apex Central:** Provides centralized monitoring and management for Trend Micro security products across large networks. A compromise offers attackers extensive lateral movement potential. The discovery of **eight critical/high vulnerabilities** (four critical in PolicyServer, two critical in Apex Central, plus four high in PolicyServer) represents a systemic failure in core security controls within these essential components of infrastructure. ### **TMEE PolicyServer Vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-49212, -49213, -49216, -49217)** * **Core Vulnerability Pattern: Insecure Deserialization** Three of the four critical flaws stem from the unsafe deserialization of untrusted data without adequate validation or type checking. This anti-pattern allows attackers to craft malicious serialized objects that, when processed, trigger unintended code execution paths. * **[CVE-2025-49212](https://success.trendmicro.com/en-US/solution/KA-0019928)(Critical):** Exploits insecure deserialization in the `PolicyValueTableSerializationBinder` class. Attackers send a specially crafted serialized object pre-authentication, resulting in **arbitrary code execution as the SYSTEM user**. * **[CVE-2025-49213](https://success.trendmicro.com/en-US/solution/KA-0019928) (Critical):** Targets deserialization within the `PolicyServerWindowsService` class. Similar to CVE-49212, unauthenticated attackers achieve **SYSTEM-level RCE** via malicious serialized payloads. * **[CVE-2025-49217](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4217) (Critical/High\*):** Resides in the `ValidateToken` method. While exploitation complexity is marginally higher (potentially requiring specific object chaining or gadget discovery), successful attack still yields **pre-auth SYSTEM-level RCE**. (\*Note: ZDI assessed as High severity). * **Exploitation Impact:** SYSTEM privileges grant attackers complete control over the PolicyServer host, enabling decryption key theft, policy manipulation disabling encryption, installation of persistent malware, and lateral movement into managed endpoints. #### **Core Vulnerability Pattern: Broken Authentication** * **[CVE-2025-49216](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49216) (Critical):** A fundamental flaw in the `DbAppDomain` service authentication mechanism allows **complete authentication bypass**. Remote attackers can forge requests appearing as authenticated administrators, enabling full administrative control over the PolicyServer without valid credentials. This flaw facilitates stealthy persistence, policy alteration, and credential harvesting. ### **Apex Central Vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-49219, -49220)** * **Core Vulnerability Pattern: Insecure Deserialization (Revisited)** Both critical RCE flaws in Apex Central echo the deserialization failures seen in PolicyServer, impacting different entry points: * **[CVE-2025-49219](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49219) (Critical, CVSS 9.8):** Exploits insecure deserialization within the `GetReportDetailView` method. Unauthenticated attackers achieve **RCE in the context of the NETWORK SERVICE account**. * **[CVE-2025-49220](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49220) (Critical, CVSS 9.8):** Leverages improper input validation during deserialization in the `ConvertFromJson` method. Pre-authentication exploitation leads to **arbitrary code execution as NETWORK SERVICE**. * **Exploitation Impact:** While NETWORK SERVICE has fewer inherent privileges than SYSTEM, compromise provides a potent beachhead within the security management infrastructure. Attackers gain access to sensitive monitoring data, agent configurations, and the ability to push malicious updates or commands to all managed security products (AV, EDR, etc.). ### **Additional Risks & Patch Scope** * **PolicyServer High-Severity Flaws:** The update also addresses four high-severity vulnerabilities, including SQL injection and privilege escalation paths. While not enabling direct pre-auth RCE, these flaws significantly lower the barrier for post-compromise persistence and data exfiltration. * **Universal Impact & Mitigation Absence:** All documented vulnerabilities impact **all prior versions** of the respective products up to the immediate predecessor of the patched release. Critically, Trend Micro confirms **no viable workarounds or mitigations exist** besides patching. * **Trend Micro Endpoint Encryption PolicyServer:** Install version **6.0.0.4013 (Patch 1 Update 6)**. * **Trend Micro Apex Central:** * **On-Premise (2019):** Apply **Patch B7007**. * **Apex Central as a Service:** Patches are applied automatically on the backend; no customer action required (verification recommended). While Trend Micro reports no active exploitation in the wild (as of June 2025), the nature of these vulnerabilities creates a desirable target for advanced threat actors: * **Pre-Authentication Exploitation:** Eliminates the need for credential theft or phishing. * **High Privileges:** SYSTEM (PolicyServer) provides maximum control; NETWORK SERVICE (Apex Central) offers broad access. * **Critical Product Function:** Compromise grants control over encryption enforcement (PolicyServer) or enterprise-wide security management (Apex Central). * **POC Availability:** Vulnerabilities of this nature (insecure deserialization) often see rapid Proof-of-Concept (PoC) development once details are public. The ZDI disclosure (noting the severity difference for CVE-49217) signals researcher attention. The cluster of vulnerabilities in Trend Micro's Apex Central and TMEE PolicyServer represents a severe systemic risk to organizations relying on these products for critical security and compliance functions. The recurring theme of **insecure deserialization** highlights a fundamental weakness in input validation and object processing pipelines, while the **authentication bypass** (CVE-49216) indicates critical flaws in access control implementation. **Immediate Actions:** 1. **Patch Urgently:** Apply PolicyServer v6.0.0.4013 and Apex Central Patch B7007 (On-Prem) immediately. Verify automatic patching for Apex Central SaaS. 2. **Inventory & Scan:** Identify all instances of Apex Central and TMEE PolicyServer within the enterprise. Conduct vulnerability scans confirming patch levels. 3. **Monitor Logs:** Aggressively monitor authentication logs, service execution logs, and network traffic to/from these servers for anomalous activity (especially pre-auth RCE attempts or unexpected administrative actions). 4. **Defense-in-Depth:** Enforce strict network segmentation, limiting access to management interfaces only to absolutely necessary administrative networks/hosts. Implement robust EDR/NDR solutions to detect post-exploitation activities. The absence of workarounds underscores the criticality of patching. Organizations in regulated sectors face not only operational disruption but also significant compliance and reputational risks if these central security management platforms are compromised. These vulnerabilities transform the very tools designed to protect the enterprise into potent vectors for its compromise.

loading..   13-Jun-2025
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Snowflake

Shinyhunter

Arkana Security listed 569GB of "new" Ticketmaster data? Our deep dive reveals i...

Over the past weekend, the cybersecurity landscape buzzed with alarming reports: the relatively new extortion outfit, **Arkana Security**, brazenly listed over **569 GB of allegedly fresh Ticketmaster data** for sale on its dark web leak site. Screenshots flaunting databases and file directories fueled immediate speculation of a devastating *new* breach impacting the world's largest ticketing platform. However, this analysis has pierced this facade, revealing a calculated deception. The data isn’t new; it’s a cynical **repackage of the massive cache stolen during the widespread 2024 Snowflake credential compromise attacks**, originally orchestrated by the notorious **ShinyHunters** group. ### **Deconstructing Arkana's Claim** 1. **Initial Posting:** Arkana Security promoted the Ticketmaster data dump, implying recent exfiltration. The sheer volume (569 GB) suggested a significant compromise, triggering urgent inquiries and media alerts. 2. **Smoking Gun - "RapeFlaked":** Crucially, one image accompanying Arkana's listing bore the damning caption: **"rapeflaked copy 4 quick sale 1 buyer."** This term is not generic hacker slang; it's a direct reference to **"RapeFlake"** – a **custom malicious tool** specifically developed and deployed by the threat actors behind the Snowflake attacks. RapeFlake's purpose was reconnaissance and data exfiltration from Snowflake customer instances using stolen credentials. 3. **Digital Fingerprint Match:** Security researchers conducted a meticulous comparison. The **file names, structures, and samples** showcased by Arkana **precisely matched** data samples they had previously analyzed and confirmed as originating from the **Ticketmaster breach via Snowflake**, disclosed and confirmed by the company in late May 2024. This digital fingerprint is undeniable evidence of origin. ### **Revisiting the Snowflake Onslaught** The **2024 Snowflake credential theft campaign** stands as one of the most significant supply-chain-style attacks of the year: * **Method:** Attackers leveraged credentials stolen by **infostealer malware** (like Vidar, Risepro, Lumma, etc.) from infected employee devices. These credentials provided direct access to Snowflake customer accounts *without* exploiting vulnerabilities in Snowflake itself. * **Perpetrator:** The campaign was widely claimed and executed by **ShinyHunters**, a prolific and aggressive extortion group with a long history of high-profile breaches. * **Victims:** Beyond Ticketmaster, confirmed victims included **Santander Bank, AT&T, Advance Auto Parts, Neiman Marcus, Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), Pure Storage, and Cylance (a subsidiary of BlackBerry)** – demonstrating the attack's massive breadth. * **Ticketmaster's Ordeal:** Ticketmaster became a prime ShinyHunters target. After the initial Snowflake compromise, the group escalated extortion by leaking samples, even claiming to release print-at-home tickets, including highly sought-after **Taylor Swift tickets**, on hacking forums. Ticketmaster officially confirmed the breach stemming from the Snowflake incident in late May. ### **Arkana's Play: Opportunism, Recycling, and Uncertainty** Arkana Security's actions represent a concerning trend in the cybercrime ecosystem: 1. **Data Recycling for Profit:** Instead of conducting a new breach, Arkana is attempting to **monetize previously stolen data**. This could be because: * They purchased the data from ShinyHunters or a middleman. * They are a splinter group or affiliates with access to the original haul. * They simply obtained a copy circulating in underground markets. 2. **Creating Illusion for Leverage:** By presenting old data as new ("quick sale"), Arkana aims to: * Generate fresh panic and media attention. * Apply renewed pressure on Ticketmaster. * Attract a buyer willing to pay for what they mistakenly believe is exclusive, newly compromised information. 3. **ShinyHunters Connection? Murky Waters:** The direct link between Arkana and ShinyHunters remains unclear: * **Collaboration?** Are they working together to maximize extortion pressure or reach different buyer pools? * **Resellers?** Is Arkana purely a downstream distributor? * **Rebranding/Splintering?** Given ShinyHunters' history of arrests (see below), is Arkana a new face for old actors? * The shared reference to RapeFlake strongly suggests *some* level of connection or access to the original attackers' tools and narratives. ### **ShinyHunters Shadow** Understanding ShinyHunters is key to contextualizing this event: * **Prolific Track Record:** Responsible for countless breaches, including the monumental **PowerSchool compromise** affecting **62.4 million students and 9.5 million teachers** across 6,505 school districts globally. * **Evolving Tactics:** Recently linked by Mandiant to campaigns targeting **Salesforce accounts**, stealing customer data for extortion. * **Identity Crisis:** Law enforcement has scored significant victories: * Sebastien Raoult ("Sezyo Kaizen") sentenced to 3 years and a $5m restitution order (2023). * Multiple alleged members arrested in France and Australia (Operation TOURNIQUET, 2024). * This raises a critical question: Is the *current* ShinyHunters activity the original group, remnants, or entirely new actors cynically adopting the infamous brand to confuse law enforcement and capitalize on its notoriety? Adding intrigue, Arkana Security **removed the Ticketmaster data listing from their leak site on June 9th**. Possible reasons include: * Securing a buyer in their desired "quick sale." * Negative attention from researchers/media debunking the "new breach" claim. * Pressure from law enforcement or other threat actors. * Internal group decisions.

loading..   10-Jun-2025
loading..   4 min read
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Botnet

BADBOX

FBI confirms BADBOX 2.0 botnet infected 1M+ devices across 222 countries. Learn ...

The FBI confirms over 1 million consumer devices have been weaponised in the *BADBOX 2.0 botnet* – a sophisticated malware operation exploiting Chinese-manufactured smart devices to create criminal proxy networks. ### **Global Infection Map: Brazil & U.S. Hit Hardest** *Top 5 Infected Nations:* 1. **Brazil**: 37.62% of infected devices 2. **United States**: 18.21% 3. **Mexico**: 6.32% 4. **Argentina**: 5.31% 5. **Colombia**: 2.70% ### **How BADBOX 2.0 Infects Your Devices: 3 Attack Vectors** 1. **Pre-Installed Malware** Devices manufactured with hidden backdoors in Chinese factories – undetectable to consumers. 2. **Trojanized Firmware Updates** Fake "system updates" inject persistent malware surviving factory resets. 3. **Malicious App Stores** Unofficial marketplaces (e.g., "free streaming" apps) bypass Google Play Protect. ### **74 Confirmed Compromised Device Models** | High-Risk Categories | Example Models | |----------------------|----------------| | **Android TV Boxes** | X96Q, X96Max_Plus2, TX3mini | | **Smart Projectors** | Projector_T6P, LongTV_GN7501E | | **Uncertified Tablets** | KM9PRO, KM6, Q96MAX | | **Streaming Sticks** | Q9 Stick, M8SPROW | | **Budget Smart TVs** | Fujicom-SmartTV, TV008 | ### **Botnet Capabilities: Why the FBI is Warning You** #### Residential Proxy Services Cybercriminals sell access to victims’ home IPs ($0.50-$5/day per IP) to mask: - Banking fraud - Phishing campaigns - Illegal content distribution #### Ad Fraud Operation Hidden processes generate $3M+/month by: - Simulating 20,000+ ad clicks/hour - Faking app installs - Exploiting affiliate programs #### Credential Stuffing Attacks Botnet bypasses geo-blocks and rate limits using residential IPs to test: - 500M+ stolen credentials monthly - Corporate VPN logins - Financial service accounts ### **Critical Mitigation Steps (FBI Recommendations)** *(Numbered list for featured snippet targeting)* 1. **Audit Your Network** Check all IoT devices against the infected model list. Disconnect uncertified Android devices immediately. 2. **Block Unofficial App Stores** Never disable Google Play Protect. Avoid "free streaming" apps like *Mobdro* or *Cinema HD*. 3. **Monitor Traffic Anomalies** Look for suspicious outbound connections to: - 185.225.73[.]25 (Bulgaria) - 154.53.224[.]166 (Germany) - 23.227.196[.]48 (Cloudflare) 4. **Patch Aggressively** Prioritize updates for: - Firewalls - Router firmware - Android security patches > **Expert Tip**: Segment IoT devices on guest networks to limit breach impact. ### **Evolution of a Botnet: BADBOX Timeline** - **2023**: Original BADBOX discovered pre-installed on T95 TV boxes - **Oct 2024**: German BSI disrupts botnet via sinkhole operation - **Mar 2025**: HUMAN discovers 1M+ devices infected in 222 countries - **Jun 2025**: FBI/Google coalition disrupts 500k+ devices in BADBOX 2.0

loading..   06-Jun-2025
loading..   2 min read