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API

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TotalEnergies Breach Grows 105x, 22 Million Records Exposed by API Flaws

Energy giant faces unprecedented cyber escalation as threat actors target API infrastructure, highlighting urgent need for automated security solutions

04-Jun-2025
4 min read

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Related Articles

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Colorama

PyPi

Sophisticated PyPI attack targets Colorama users with cross-platform malware, ev...

A sophisticated supply chain attack targeting the Python Package Index (PyPI) has exposed systemic vulnerabilities in open-source ecosystems, leveraging the popularity of the **colorama** library—a tool with over **215 million monthly downloads**—to deploy cross-platform malware. Discovered by Checkmarx researchers in May 2024, the campaign combined typosquatting, multi-platform payloads, and advanced evasion techniques, highlighting the escalating threats to software supply chains. ## Typosquatting Meets Cross-Ecosystem Deception ### Exploiting Trust in Open-Source Repositories The attackers uploaded malicious PyPI packages with names like **coloramapkgs**, **coloraiz**, and **colorizator**, mimicking both **colorama** (Python) and **colorizr** (NPM) to exploit developer confusion[1][2][9]. This cross-ecosystem baiting tactic—using NPM-inspired names on PyPI—marked a novel escalation in supply chain attacks, potentially targeting JavaScript developers unfamiliar with Python-specific tools[1][2]. ### Multi-Platform Payloads for Maximum Impact Distinct payloads were tailored for **Windows** and **Linux** systems: - **Windows variants** harvested environment variables (e.g., AWS keys) from the registry, disabled Defender via PowerShell, and established persistence through scheduled tasks[1][2][8]. - **Linux payloads** deployed RSA-encrypted reverse shells via **gs-netcat**, masqueraded as kernel processes, and modified **systemd** services for stealth. ## Advanced Evasion & Data Exfiltration ### Windows-Specific Tactics The malware executed commands to bypass defenses: ```powershell Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true ``` It also exfiltrated data via Pastebin’s API and GitHub repositories (e.g., `github.com/s7bhme`), leveraging legitimate services to avoid detection[1][2][8]. ### Linux Payload Sophistication Base64-encoded scripts in `__init__.py` files decrypted into: 1. A public key stored in `/tmp/pub.pem` for encrypted C2 communications. 2. A persistence script injecting malicious code into `.bashrc` and `crontab`. ## Industry Impact: 170,000+ Developers Compromised The attack compromised the GitHub account of a **Top.gg maintainer** (community: 170k+ members), introducing malicious commits to the `python-sdk` repository[8][17]. Stolen data included: - Browser credentials (Chrome, Edge, Brave) - Discord and Telegram session tokens - Cryptocurrency wallet keys. ## Broader Supply Chain Threat Landscape ### A Record Year for Attacks Supply chain incidents surged by **100% YoY**, with **183,000+ customers** affected globally[7][16]. The Colorama attack mirrors trends observed in: - **NPM’s warbeast2000 campaign** (Jan 2024): Stole SSH keys via malicious modules[13]. - **PyPI’s March 2024 suspension**: 500+ typosquatted packages targeting `requests` and `colorama`[9]. ### Open-Source Vulnerabilities Persist Analysis of 30 popular packages revealed **27 flaws per component on average**, with **6 critical vulnerabilities** each[1][6]. Despite PyPI’s popularity (800k+ users), its openness makes it prone to exploitation. ## Mitigation Strategies: SBOMs & Repository Hardening ### Software Composition Analysis (SCA) Tools SCA solutions like **Sonatype** and **Invicti** can: - Detect malicious dependencies in CI/CD pipelines. - Generate Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) for vulnerability tracking[6][15][18]. ### PyPI Security Enhancements The OpenSSF’s **Principles for Package Repository Security** (v0.1) recommends: - Mandatory MFA for maintainers. - Short-lived API tokens via OpenID Connect. - Machine learning-driven malicious package detection. ## Regulatory Response & Future Outlook CISA’s **SBOM Framework** (Oct 2024) mandates transparency in software components, requiring: - License and copyright holder disclosures. - Risk management integration for critical infrastructure[4][15][20]. **Expert Take:** *“This attack underscores that supply chain security isn’t just about code—it’s about the entire ecosystem’s resilience. Developers must adopt zero-trust principles for dependencies.”* – Ariel Harush, Checkmarx. With **72,065 SBOMs published in 2023** and PyPI downloads exceeding **241 million/month**, the industry must prioritize: - Automated dependency scanning. - Cross-repository threat intelligence sharing. - Regulatory compliance with CISA’s SBOM guidelines. As supply chain attacks evolve, proactive collaboration—not just reactive measures—will define cybersecurity success in 2025 and beyond.

loading..   02-Jun-2025
loading..   3 min read
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WLC

Cisco

Critical CVE-2025-20188: Unauthenticated RCE in Cisco IOS XE WLCs. Exploits publ...

Technical details revealing how to exploit a maximum-severity vulnerability (**CVE-2025-20188**) in Cisco IOS XE Wireless LAN Controllers (WLC) have been publicly released, significantly raising the risk of imminent attacks. Horizon3 researchers published a deep dive into the flaw, enabling skilled threat actors—or even advanced AI systems—to weaponize it within hours. ### Why This Flaw Is Critical Disclosed by Cisco on May 7, 2025, this 9.8-CVSS vulnerability allows **unauthenticated attackers to upload malicious files, traverse directories, and execute arbitrary commands with root privileges**. The attack exploits a hardcoded JSON Web Token (JWT) secret (`notfound`) used by Cisco’s OpenResty backend when the `/tmp/nginx_jwt_key` file is missing. Attackers can forge valid tokens to bypass authentication entirely. **Affected Devices**: - Catalyst 9800-CL WLCs (Cloud) - Catalyst 9800 Embedded WLC (Catalyst 9300/9400/9500 Switches) - Catalyst 9800 Series WLCs - Embedded WLC on Catalyst APs > **Key Trigger**: The ‘Out-of-Band AP Image Download’ feature **must be enabled** for devices to be vulnerable. ### Horizon3’s Weaponization Blueprint Horizon3’s analysis demonstrates how attackers can: 1. **Forge JWT tokens** using the hardcoded `notfound` secret. 2. Upload files via the `/ap_spec_rec/upload/` endpoint (port 8443) using **path traversal** (e.g., `../../`). 3. Overwrite critical files (e.g., configs, scripts) to achieve **Remote Code Execution (RCE)**. In their example, attackers overwrite configurations monitored by the `pvp.sh` service, triggering a reload to execute malicious payloads with **root privileges**. ![Diagram: Exploit flow showing JWT forgery and file upload to RCE](https://example.com/cisco-cve-2025-20188-exploit-flow.png) *Source: Horizon3 Attack Breakdown* ### Mitigation Steps: Act Now Cisco confirms active exploits are expected within days. Take **immediate action**: 1. **PATCH**: Upgrade to IOS XE **17.12.04 or later**. 2. **TEMPORARY FIX**: Disable **‘Out-of-Band AP Image Download’** via: ```bash config t > wireless profile ap-download > no out-of-band ap-image-download enable ``` ### The Bottom Line This flaw transforms a simple file upload into full device takeover. With technical roadmaps now public, unpatched networks face severe ransomware, espionage, and botnet recruitment risks. Cisco administrators must treat this as an **emergency patch scenario**. > **Update Status**: Cisco confirms no public exploits yet, but warns weaponization is imminent. Monitor [CVE-2025-20188 Bulletin](https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory) for updates.

loading..   31-May-2025
loading..   2 min read
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RMM

ConnectWise

ConnectWise confirms nation-state cyberattack exploiting ScreenConnect flaw (CVE...

**TAMPA, FL – May 31, 2025** – ConnectWise, a leading provider of IT management software for Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and IT departments, has disclosed a significant cybersecurity incident involving a suspected nation-state actor. The breach impacted a limited number of customers using its cloud-hosted ScreenConnect remote access solution, raising concerns within the MSP community reliant on the platform. In a brief advisory issued this week, ConnectWise stated: *"ConnectWise recently learned of suspicious activity within our environment that we believe was tied to a sophisticated nation state actor, which affected a very small number of ScreenConnect customers."* The company emphasized the targeted nature of the attack, suggesting only a select group of clients were compromised. **Forensics, Law Enforcement Engaged Amidst Limited Details** ConnectWise confirmed it has launched a comprehensive investigation, enlisting the expertise of premier cybersecurity forensics firm Mandiant. The company also stated it is coordinating with law enforcement agencies and has directly contacted all affected customers. However, critical details remain scarce. ConnectWise declined to answer inquiries from BleepingComputer regarding the exact number of impacted customers, the specific timeframe of the breach, or whether any malicious activity was observed within the compromised ScreenConnect customer instances themselves. **Source Points to 2024 Breach, Cloud Instances Targeted** According to a source familiar with the incident who spoke to BleepingComputer, the initial breach occurred as far back as **August 2024**, with ConnectWise discovering the suspicious activity only in **May 2025**. The source further indicated that **only cloud-based ScreenConnect instances** were impacted. BleepingComputer notes it has not been able to independently verify these dates. ConnectWise has not publicly commented on this timeline. **Link to Patched ScreenConnect Vulnerability Emerges** While ConnectWise's advisory did not specify the initial attack vector, details emerging from customer discussions on Reddit and technical analysis point strongly to the exploitation of a high-severity vulnerability in ScreenConnect, tracked as **CVE-2025-3935**. This flaw, patched by ConnectWise on **April 24, 2025**, was a ViewState code injection vulnerability caused by unsafe deserialization within the ASP.NET framework, affecting ScreenConnect versions 25.2.3 and earlier. The vulnerability, rated "High" priority by ConnectWise (indicating either active exploitation or high risk), allowed threat actors with privileged system-level access to steal secret machine keys. These keys could then be weaponized to craft malicious payloads enabling **remote code execution (RCE)** on the vulnerable ScreenConnect server. **Cloud Focus Suggests Potential Attack Path** Given ConnectWise's confirmation that only cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances (served via `screenconnect.com` and `hostedrmm.com`) were affected, cybersecurity experts theorize a likely attack sequence: 1. **Initial Compromise:** Threat actors breached ConnectWise's own internal corporate network (the "environment" referenced). 2. **Key Theft:** Attackers stole the secret machine keys used to secure ScreenConnect cloud servers. 3. **Server Compromise:** Using the stolen keys, attackers could bypass security and execute remote code on ConnectWise's ScreenConnect cloud infrastructure. 4. **Customer Impact:** This server-level access potentially allowed attackers to pivot into the environments of the targeted customers using those specific cloud instances. *Crucially, ConnectWise has not confirmed this specific attack path or whether customer environments were actually accessed via the compromised servers.* **Frustration Mounts Over Lack of Specifics** Despite ConnectWise's outreach to affected customers, several MSPs have expressed significant frustration on forums like Reddit over the lack of detailed **Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)** and specific technical information about what occurred within their instances. This lack of transparency hinders their ability to conduct thorough internal investigations and assure their own clients. **ScreenConnect: A Repeated Target** This incident marks the second major security event involving ScreenConnect in recent years. In February 2024, a critical vulnerability (**CVE-2024-1709**) was widely exploited by ransomware gangs and a North Korean state-sponsored hacking group (APT), leading to numerous compromises before a patch was deployed. This history underscores the attractiveness of remote access tools to advanced threat actors. **ConnectWise's Response and Recommendations** ConnectWise states it has implemented "enhanced monitoring" and "hardened security" across its network. They also report seeing "no further suspicious activity in customer instances" since containment measures were enacted. The company had patched the CVE-2025-3935 vulnerability on its cloud platforms *before* publicly disclosing it to customers. **Advice for ScreenConnect Users (Especially Cloud):** 1. **Verify Patch Status:** Ensure *all* ScreenConnect instances (cloud or self-hosted) are updated to a version **later than 25.2.3**, specifically patching CVE-2025-3935. ConnectWise manages cloud instances, but confirmation of patching is prudent. 2. **Scrutinize Communications:** Affected cloud customers should closely review all communications from ConnectWise and follow any specific guidance provided. 3. **Enhanced Monitoring:** All ScreenConnect users, particularly those on cloud, should implement heightened monitoring for unusual remote access activity, privilege escalations, or unexpected processes on endpoints managed via ScreenConnect. 4. **Review Access Logs:** Conduct thorough audits of ScreenConnect access logs for the period potentially dating back to August 2024 (if the source timeline is accurate), looking for anomalies. 5. **Assume Potential Compromise (Impacted Customers):** Affected organizations should initiate incident response procedures, including credential rotations, system scans, and investigations for potential lateral movement. The investigation involving Mandiant and law enforcement is ongoing. ConnectWise has promised to provide updates as more information becomes available and can be shared. This incident highlights the persistent threat faced by IT management platforms and the critical importance of rapid patching and robust supply chain security for MSPs and their clients.

loading..   30-May-2025
loading..   5 min read