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Spreadshirt

PayPal

Data Breach

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Spreadshirt & Co. Hacked: Threat Actors accessed users Bank details & PayPal addresses

Spreadshirt & CO., an online merchandise platform, was hacked, Bank credentials & PayPal addresses of users were reportedly compromised...

14-Jul-2021
3 min read

No content available.

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BitBucket

GitLab

Over 17,000 sensitive secrets leaked from public GitLab repos, exposing major se...

Based on the research by security engineer Luke Marshall, who uncovered over 6,000 live secrets in public Bitbucket repositories, the narrative is clear: established enterprise platforms are an overlooked goldmine for attackers, harboring long-forgotten, highly impactful credentials. This article reconstructs his investigation to provide a technically detailed account of the findings and their broader implications for cloud security. ### Why Bitbucket? While much of the security community's attention has been on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, Bitbucket has been a compelling target for investigation. In operation since 2008 and owned by Atlassian, it hosts code for thousands of enterprises. Its appeal to security researchers stemmed from two key factors: the inherent nature of Git, which can bury secrets deep within commit history, and the fact that it has not received the same level of scrutiny from security tooling and researchers as its competitors. This combination suggested a potential trove of undiscovered exposed credentials. ### Engineering a Large-Scale Scan To accurately assess the scale of the problem, the goal was to scan every public Bitbucket Cloud repository—a total of 2,636,562 as of the initial research date. Handling this volume required a robust and scalable automation strategy. The solution was a serverless architecture built on AWS, chosen for its ability to handle the massive workload efficiently. The process involved two core components : 1. A local Python script that fed all 2.6 million repository names into an AWS Simple Queue Service (SQS) queue, creating a durable and managed task list . 2. An AWS Lambda function, triggered by the queue, that performed the actual scanning using TruffleHog with a concurrency of 300. This setup ensured no repository was scanned twice and provided fault tolerance; if any part of the process failed, it could seamlessly resume without losing progress. This architecture enabled the scanning of all 2.6 million repositories over a single weekend . ### A Legacy of Exposure The scan yielded **6,212 verified live secrets** . The analysis of these secrets revealed several alarming trends that challenge conventional security assumptions. The table below breaks down the leaked credentials by service and file type, showing where and how these exposures occurred : | **Secrets by Cloud Service** | **Secrets by File Extension** | | :--- | :--- | | • **GCP**: 977 secrets<br>• **AWS IAM**: High-impact<br>• **SendGrid**: High-impact<br>• **MongoDB**: High-impact<br>• **OpenAI**: High-impact<br>• **Atlassian**: 247 secrets<br>• **Azure Storage**: High-impact<br>• **Stripe, Slack, Twilio**: High-impact | • **JSON**: Most common<br>• **PHP**: 4th most common<br>• **Python (.py)**: Large footprint<br>• **JavaScript (.js)**: Large footprint | One of the most surprising findings was the age of the live credentials. The research uncovered secrets that had been sitting exposed for years, including a live AWS key committed **12 years ago**, in June 2013. The research graph shows a consistent average of 600-700 live secrets exposed each year between 2018 and 2024. This indicates that once a secret is committed, it often remains alive and undiscovered indefinitely. A particularly ironic finding was the disproportionately high number of exposed credentials for Atlassian's own products, including Jira, Bitbucket, and Opsgenie. In total, 247 valid Atlassian credentials were discovered, a volume much higher than seen in similar scans of other software ecosystems . ### Defense and Response The findings underscore a critical need for robust defensive measures. To address these risks, Bitbucket has integrated a native **secret scanning feature**. This scanner checks new commits for over 800 patterns of known secret types and alerts authors and committers via email when a potential leak is detected. The system is customizable, allowing admins to define their own regular expression (regex) patterns for proprietary secret formats and create allow lists to reduce false positives. However, technology alone is not enough. The research also triggered a vital security response. Alongside the TruffleHog team, the researcher participated in a responsible disclosure process that led to the revocation of thousands of live secrets. Furthermore, 11 critical P1 vulnerabilities were submitted to bug bounty programs, and over 50 organizations were notified of their exposed secrets. ### Key Takeaways for Security Teams This investigation offers crucial insights for the security community: * **Assess Your Entire Ecosystem**: Security efforts must include all code hosting platforms in use, not just the most popular ones. Overlooked, legacy systems can present significant risk . * **Secrets Have a Long Lifespan**: The discovery of a 12-year-old live AWS key proves that "secrets don't rot." Credentials exposed in the past remain a threat until they are actively found and revoked. **Assume Compromise and Rotate**: If a secret is discovered in a repository, treat it as compromised. Simply removing it from the git history is insufficient, as the commit may exist in forks, clones, or other branches. The only safe response is to **immediately revoke and rotate the credential**. **Leverage Available Tools**: Proactively use secret-scanning tools like TruffleHog or native features on platforms like Bitbucket to continuously monitor for accidental exposures, both in real-time and through historical analysis.

loading..   28-Nov-2025
loading..   5 min read
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UK

A coordinated ransomware attack has disrupted IT systems for at least eight loca...

A significant, coordinated cyberattack has targeted the shared IT infrastructure of at least eight London boroughs, severely degrading public services. The incident is identified as a ransomware campaign, impacting systems managed under a common provider model. National cybersecurity authorities are engaged in a critical response operation. #### **Operational Impact Analysis** The attack vector follows a classic ransomware payload deployment, but its impact is magnified due to the centralized infrastructure model. | Impact Area | Technical Manifestation | Service-Level Consequence | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **Core Infrastructure** | Widespread encryption of data assets across shared servers and databases. | Systemic outage of primary business applications and citizen portals. | | **Communication Channels** | Email server clusters and VoIP systems taken offline as a containment measure. | Severely hampered internal coordination and public communication. | | **Citizen Services** | Housing repair platforms, benefits processing systems (Housing Benefit, Council Tax Support), and planning application portals rendered inoperative. | Halting of critical financial support services and statutory functions. | | **Data Exfiltration** | **UNCONFIRMED.** Standard investigative procedure is to assess for Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) related to data theft, a common double-extortion tactic. | Potential for significant data breach, elevating risk beyond operational disruption to long-term privacy concerns. | #### **Attack Vector Analysis** The threat actors exploited the **single points of failure** inherent in the shared-services model provided by **London Councils**. * **Attack Method:** Ransomware Deployment. * **Leveraged Vulnerability:** The compromise of a centralized IT provider created a cascading failure, simultaneously impacting all connected boroughs. This is a textbook example of a **software supply chain attack** within a public sector context. * **Tactical Assessment:** The scale and coordination suggest a sophisticated actor targeting a high-value, multi-tenant environment to maximize disruption and potential ransom leverage. #### **Incident Response** The response has been escalated to the national level, indicating the severity of the incident. * **Activated Agencies:** National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and National Crime Agency (NCA). * **Containment Measures:** Isolation of affected networks and failover to manual, paper-based processes for critical services. * **Strategic Implications:** 1. **Public Sector Cyber Resilience:** This event critically questions the risk-benefit analysis of centralized IT models for essential services without isolated, redundant fail-safes. 2. **Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) Blur:** Attacks on local government, which manages housing and welfare, demonstrate how non-traditional CNI is becoming a primary target for destabilization. 3. **The "To Pay or Not To Pay" Dilemma:** The potential for large-scale exfiltration of citizen data places immense pressure on authorities, balancing immediate recovery against the precedent of funding criminal enterprises. This incident transcends a typical IT outage; it is a systemic failure of a critical public service platform. The restoration of services is the immediate priority. Still, the long-term consequences will involve a mandatory, thorough post-incident review of shared service security architectures, data governance policies, and incident response playbooks across the entire UK public sector.

loading..   27-Nov-2025
loading..   3 min read
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SitusAMC

Data breach at SitusAMC, a financial services vendor, exposed homeowner and empl...

For millions of Americans, their mortgage is a deeply personal, often stressful, cornerstone of their financial life. They deal with their bank, make their payments, and trust that the complex machinery behind the scenes is secure. That trust was fractured earlier this year when SitusAMC, a powerhouse in the commercial and residential real estate finance industry, announced it had been the victim of a massive ransomware attack that exposed the sensitive data of over 1.5 million individuals. But the breach of SitusAMC is more than just another entry in the long list of corporate cyberattacks. A deeper investigation reveals a story of critical contextual nuances: it’s a breach not of a consumer-facing company, but of a critical, invisible linchpin in the financial system; an attack that highlights the profound risks of third-party service providers; and an event whose fallout lands disproportionately on individuals who never knew the company's name. **The "Invisible" Target with a Treasure Trove of Data** Unlike a breach at a retailer or a social media platform, SitusAMC operates deep in the background. Most consumers have never heard of them, yet the company provides "servicing" and "sub-servicing" for a vast portfolio of mortgages. This means they are responsible for the administrative backbone of loans—processing payments, managing escrow accounts, handling foreclosures, and, crucially, storing the immense volumes of documentation required by these processes. _"This is the critical nuance that makes this breach so severe,"_ explains Dr. Aris Thorne, a cybersecurity professor at Georgetown University. "SitusAMC is what's known as a 'target-rich environment.' They don't just have one type of data; they have *all* of it. For a single individual, an attacker could potentially get their Social Security number, mortgage application, tax returns, credit history, bank account details, and driver's license copy—all from one place. It's a one-stop shop for identity theft." The attackers, the notorious ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware cartel, knew exactly what they were targeting. They didn't just lock files; they exfiltrated over 2 terabytes of data, holding it for ransom with the threat of releasing it onto the dark web. **When a "Vendor" Breach Becomes "Your" Breach** The second critical nuance lies in the chain of responsibility. Many of the affected individuals did not have a direct relationship with SitusAMC. Their loan was with a local bank or a major lender, which had contracted SitusAMC to handle the back-office work. "This creates a confusing and fragmented response for the victim," says Maria Flores, a consumer advocate with the National Fair Housing Alliance. "You get a letter from a company you've never heard of, about a loan you have with your bank. It erodes trust and creates immense confusion. Who is ultimately responsible? Your bank will often point to the vendor, and the vendor points to the fact that they are acting on the bank's behalf. The consumer is left in the middle." This "supply chain" attack vector is a growing nightmare for regulators. The breach didn't happen at the point of sale (the bank), but at a critical support node. It underscores a harsh reality: a company's cybersecurity is only as strong as the weakest link in its extended network of partners and vendors. **A Legacy of Vulnerability** The data exposed isn't just current information. The breach includes data from "former homeowners," a phrase that carries its own heavy weight. "For individuals who went through a foreclosure, a short sale, or even those who simply paid off their loan years ago, this breach reopens old wounds," Flores notes. "Their financial situation may have been precarious during that time, and this data provides a snapshot of their most vulnerable moment. To have that exposed adds a layer of psychological distress to the financial risk." Furthermore, for current homeowners, the breach creates a unique form of anxiety. The theft of ongoing mortgage and financial account information means the threat isn't just about a new credit card being opened fraudulently; it's about the potential for sophisticated fraud targeting their largest asset—their home. **A Tepid Response in a High-Stakes Environment** SitusAMC's response, while following standard protocol, has been criticized for not matching the severity of the exposed data. The offer of 24 months of credit monitoring, while standard, is seen by experts as a band-aid on a gaping wound. "Credit monitoring is reactive; it tells you *after* something bad has happened," says Dr. Thorne. "With the depth of information stolen—including SSNs and driver's licenses—the threat of identity theft is lifelong. The criminals can sit on this data for years before using it. Two years of monitoring is insufficient for a breach of this sensitivity." The incident has prompted calls for stricter regulations governing third-party vendors in the financial sector and for mandatory, long-term identity restoration services, rather than temporary monitoring, in cases involving core identity documents. As the investigation continues and lawsuits mount, the SitusAMC breach serves as a stark lesson. It’s a reminder that in our interconnected financial ecosystem, risk is not always visible, and trust in one company often means implicit trust in a dozen others behind the curtain. For the millions affected, the event is a jarring introduction to a company they never knew held the keys to their financial identity.

loading..   26-Nov-2025
loading..   5 min read