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Spotify

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Spotify Artist Pages Hacked Amid 2020 Wrapped Launch

During Spotify's Wrapped 2020 launch, artist pages were hacked; users urged to update passwords and review security settings

03-Dec-2020
2 min read

No content available.

Related Articles

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Clop Ransomware

Logitech breach: Clop gang exploits Oracle EBS zero-day (CVE-2025-61882) in a su...

Logitech International S.A. has filed an 8-K with the SEC [confirming](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1032975/000103297525000085/logi-20251114.htm) a significant data breach resulting from the exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability [CVE-2025-61882](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/oracle-e-business-suite-hit-by-zero-day-exploits-and-cl-0-p-attacks) in a third-party Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) instance. The Clop extortion group successfully exfiltrated approximately 1.8 terabytes of data. Critically, this was a pure data theft extortion attack; no ransomware was deployed, and operational systems remained uncompromised. #### **Attack Vector: Exploitation of Oracle E-Business Suite CVE** The initial compromise was not achieved through a weakness in Logitech's perimeter defenses but via a sophisticated supply chain attack. * **Vulnerability:** CVE-2025-61882, a critical pre-authentication vulnerability in the Oracle EBS suite. * **Exploit Mechanism:** The flaw allowed unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary PL/SQL code on the vulnerable EBS instance through a crafted HTTP request, bypassing standard authentication mechanisms. * **Privilege Escalation:** Once inside the EBS environment, the threat actors leveraged built-in EBS functions and standard database permissions to pivot and access connected file shares and databases, leading to the mass data exfiltration. #### **Threat Actor TTPs: Clop's Focused Extortion Model** The Clop group [demonstrated](https://www.secureblink.com/threat-research/clop-ransomware) a highly focused Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) playbook, diverging from their traditional ransomware deployments. * **Technique:** Data Theft for Extortion (MITRE ATT&CK TA0010). * **Procedure:** After establishing a foothold via the EBS exploit, the actors conducted reconnaissance, identified file repositories containing business-critical data (employee, customer, supplier information), and staged the data for exfiltration over a period of days, likely using encrypted channels to blend with legitimate traffic. * **Objective:** The absence of ransomware deployment indicates a strategic shift towards "low-and-slow" data exfiltration to maximize the amount of data stolen while minimizing the chance of immediate detection, relying solely on the threat of public data leakage for extortion. #### **Impact Analysis & Data Scope** Logitech's containment and forensic analysis provided a clear, albeit substantial, scope of impact. * **Data Exfiltrated:** ~1.8 TB of structured and unstructured data from systems interconnected with the compromised EBS instance. * **Data Content:** Corporate data involving employee, consumer, customer, and supplier information. Logitech's assertion that sensitive PII (National IDs, payment card data) was not compromised indicates these datasets were logically segregated and not resident on the impacted EBS application and its directly accessible storage volumes. * **Business Impact:** **None** to product operations, manufacturing, or core services, as the attack was contained within a specific business application environment and did not touch industrial control or product delivery systems. #### **Root Cause & Security Failure** The primary failure was a shortcoming in **Third-Party Risk Management (TPRM)**. While Logitech’s direct infrastructure may have been robust, its security posture was intrinsically tied to the patch management cycle of a critical vendor (Oracle). The "patch gap"—the window between a vendor releasing a patch and an enterprise applying it—was exploited by a highly agile threat actor. This incident underscores that the attack surface for modern enterprises extends far beyond their own IP ranges to include all externally managed business applications.

loading..   17-Nov-2025
loading..   3 min read
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DoorDash

DoorDash's 3rd data breach exposes millions! User data leaked in October, sparki...

The food delivery giant DoorDash is reeling from its third significant data breach in six years. Yes! The company confirmed this week that a sophisticated social engineering scam duped an employee, allowing a threat actors to pillage a trove of user contact information and exposing millions of customers, "Dasher" drivers, and merchants to heightened risk of phishing and identity theft.** ### What Happened? A Timeline of Treachery. The breach unfolded on **October 25, 2025**, when [DoorDash](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/door-dash-becomes-yet-another-victim-linked-to-twilio-sms-phishing)'s security team [detected](https://help.doordash.com/consumers/s/article/Our-response-to-a-recent-cybersecurity-incident) an unauthorized party accessing its systems. Yet, in a move that has sparked fury and legal threats, the company waited a staggering **19 days** before beginning to notify the victims on November 13 . The culprit? A single, targeted social engineering attack tricked a DoorDash employee into granting access, proving that the human element remains the weakest link in cybersecurity. ### What the Cyber-Thieves Got. While DoorDash has downplayed the severity by stating “no sensitive information was accessed,” the stolen data paints a frighteningly complete picture of users’ digital identities. The exposed information varies by individual but includes : | Affected Group | Types of Information Exposed | | :--- | :--- | | **Customers** | Full name, physical address, phone number, email address | | **Dashers** | Full name, physical address, phone number, email address | | **Merchants** | Full name, physical address, phone number, email address | This information is a gold mine for phishers and scammers, who can use it to craft highly convincing, targeted attacks. ### Public Outcry: "Incredibly Unprofessional, Dangerous, and Potentially Illegal" The 19-day notification delay has ignited a firestorm of criticism and fear. One user on social media platform X lamented, **"DoorDash took 19 whole days to notify me... my real phone number and physical address have been leaked"** . Another user, Chris from [Toronto](https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/sin.html), challenged the company's attempt to downplay the breach, stating, **"I'm sorry - if this isn't sensitive information, what is? Don't downplay this just because they didn't get credit card or password information. It's gone deaf"** . The outrage has escalated to real-world consequences, with at least one user vowing to file a case in provincial small claims court and lodge a formal complaint with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, alleging a violation of data breach laws . ### DoorDash's Third Strike This 2025 incident is not an isolated event but part of a deeply concerning pattern for the delivery giant : * **2019:** A breach exposed the data of approximately **5 million** users . * **2022:** The company was hit again in an attack linked to the violation of third-party vendor [Twilio](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/twilio-stopped-another-data-breach-started-even-before-the-august-hack). This "three-peat" of security failures has left experts and users questioning if the company has truly learned from its past mistakes. ### How to Protect Yourself Now If you are among the millions of DoorDash users, your vigilance is your best defense. Here’s what you must do immediately : * **Expect Phishing Attacks:** Be hyper-aware of unsolicited emails, texts, or calls pretending to be from DoorDash, your bank, or other services. **Do not click on links or download attachments** from suspicious messages . * **Change Your Passwords:** Immediately update your DoorDash password and ensure you are not using it for any other online accounts. * **Enable Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):** Add this critical extra layer of security to your DoorDash and email accounts . * **Remain Skeptical:** If a communication seems off, it probably is. Always log in to your accounts directly through their official websites or apps to check for updates, rather than clicking on provided links. ### DoorDash's Damage Control: Too Little, Too Late? In response to the crisis, DoorDash has issued a statement outlining its remedial actions, which include **"deploying enhancements to our security systems, implementing additional training for our employees, bringing in a leading cybersecurity forensic firm... and notifying law enforcement"**. The company has set up a dedicated, toll-free hotline for users with questions: **+1-833-918-8030** (reference code: **B155060**) As the investigation continues, one question lingers in the minds of users worldwide: Is DoorDash finally building a fortress, or just rearranging the deck chairs on a ship that has already been breached three times?

loading..   15-Nov-2025
loading..   4 min read
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NPM

A worm-like spam campaign flooded NPM with over 43,000 fake packages, exposing m...

Cybersecurity analysts have identified a large-scale, two-year spam operation that flooded the npm registry with tens of thousands of fake packages. Beginning in early 2024, a coordinated network of automated scripts started mass-publishing malicious yet functionally empty packages at high speed. The volume and persistence of the campaign made it one of the most disruptive registry-level incidents in recent years. ## Scope of the Spam Campaign Researchers [discovered](https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/the-great-indonesian-tea-theft-analyzing-a-npm-spam-campaign) that more than **43,000 bogus packages** were uploaded across multiple attacker-controlled accounts. These entries remained active on the registry for almost two years without triggering standard security or cleanup mechanisms. The [packages](https://github.com/6mile/Indonesian-Foods-Worm) shared a consistent structure, often mimicking legitimate **Next.js project templates**, which helped them blend into the ecosystem. Despite the scale, the artifacts contained **no functional malware**. Instead, they acted as placeholders designed to inflate the registry with noise. ## How the “IndonesianFoods” Worm Operated ### Self-Replicating Network The packages were not independent uploads. They were interconnected through a **self-replicating publishing system** built to automatically generate, link, and deploy new packages in rapid succession. This worm-like behavior is what led analysts to label the incident a “worm,” even though no conventional payload or exploit mechanism was involved. ### Naming Pattern and Attribution Security researchers observed a peculiar naming convention repeated across the fake packages. This unique signature inspired the community to refer to the incident as the **“IndonesianFoods” npm worm**. While the names varied, the pattern was distinct enough to correlate uploads and identify them as part of the same coordinated effort. ## Intent Behind the Campaign Unlike typical supply-chain attacks involving npm package poisoning, this campaign did **not** aim to steal data, hijack environments, or compromise build pipelines. Its purpose was purely disruptive. The objective was straightforward: **Overwhelm the npm registry with random, auto-generated packages and pollute the ecosystem.** This large-scale noise injection raises concerns about: * Reduced signal-to-noise ratio for legitimate developers * Increased risk of overlooking genuinely malicious uploads * Strain on automated security tools and scanners * Potential performance impact on registry infrastructure ## Impact on the Ecosystem Although the fake packages contained no harmful code, their scale created systemic friction for developers, maintainers, and security teams. Search results became cluttered, automated dependency monitors encountered unusually high volumes of junk data, and the registry faced an unnecessary operational load. The incident highlights a growing trend: attackers exploiting the openness of public package registries not for compromise, but for **disruption**. This shift indicates the need for stronger publishing safeguards, anomaly detection, and cleanup workflows in ecosystems like npm. ## Conclusion The “IndonesianFoods” npm worm stands out not for technical sophistication but for sheer volume and longevity. By pushing more than 43,000 interlinked fake packages over two years, the operators exposed critical gaps in registry oversight. Strengthening automated detection, enforcing stricter publishing controls, and refining ecosystem hygiene practices will be essential to prevent similar spam-driven disruptions in the future.

loading..   13-Nov-2025
loading..   3 min read