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Slack

Discord

Application Security

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Slack & Discord targeted through a malware attack by attackers

During the pandemic, threat actors adjust their tricks and techniques and target Slack and Discord

08-Apr-2021
3 min read

No content available.

Related Articles

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Ransomware

Pharma Research Firm Inotiv Confirms Massive Data Breach Following Qilin Ransomw...

**WEST LAFAYETTE, Ind. & BOSTON, Mass.** — Inotiv Inc. (NOTV), a pivotal contract research organization in the pharmaceutical development pipeline, has formally confirmed a significant data breach impacting nearly 10,000 individuals. The breach stems from a ransomware attack executed by the Qilin cybercrime group in early August 2025, culminating in the theft of highly sensitive personal, financial, and health information. The disclosure, made through mandatory regulatory filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a detailed notice to the Maine Attorney General, provides a stark case study in the modern cyber threat landscape. It illustrates a targeted assault on a scientific enterprise where the compromise of data carries profound ethical, legal, and operational consequences beyond immediate financial ransom. #### **Timeline of a Targeted Intrusion** The incident unfolded through a precise sequence of intrusion, discovery, and investigation, characteristic of a professionally executed ransomware operation. | **Date** | **Event Phase** | **Key Action & Details** | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **Aug 5-8, 2025** | **Initial Compromise & Encryption** | Qilin operatives gained access, deployed ransomware, and exfiltrated data. | | **Aug 8, 2025** | **Discovery & Containment** | Inotiv’s internal security team identified the attack, contained affected systems, and initiated forensic procedures. | | **Aug 18, 2025** | **Regulatory Disclosure** | Inotiv filed an 8-K form with the SEC, publicly acknowledging a cybersecurity incident that disrupted operations. | | **Oct 21, 2025** | **Data Analysis Completed** | Forensic investigators concluded data review, confirming the scope and sensitivity of stolen information. | | **Dec 2-3, 2025** | **Individual Notification** | Inotiv began notifying 9,542 affected individuals and submitted official breach details to the Maine AG. | #### **The Core of the Breach: A Treasure Trove of Sensitive Data** Moving beyond operational disruption, the forensic investigation revealed the attack's true severity: the successful exfiltration of approximately 162,000 files totaling 176 GB. The stolen data constitutes a comprehensive dossier on affected individuals, including: * **Personally Identifiable Information (PII):** Full names, addresses, and crucially, Social Security Numbers (SSNs) and government-issued identification numbers. * **Financial Data:** Credit and debit card numbers. * **Protected Health Information (PHI):** Medical records, health insurance details, and associated medical data. The population impacted includes current and former employees, their family members, and other associated individuals, indicating that the attackers exfiltrated data from broad-based human resources and administrative systems. #### **Corporate and Legal Response** In response, Inotiv has engaged a multi-pronged strategy focusing on remediation, legal compliance, and victim support: 1. **Technical Remediation:** The company contained the incident, restored systems from secure backups, and implemented "additional enhanced security measures." Law enforcement, including the FBI, was notified. 2. **Regulatory Compliance:** The company fulfilled its obligation under the SEC's new cybersecurity disclosure rules and state laws, formally reporting to the Maine Attorney General—a common requirement when breaches affect over 1,000 residents of a state. 3. **Victim Mitigation:** Inotiv is offering affected individuals **24 months of complimentary credit monitoring and identity restoration services** through Kroll, a standard but critical remediation step. The offer notably exceeds the 12-month period seen in many other breaches, such as the contemporaneous incident at Jack's Family Restaurants. #### **Nuanced Implications: Why This Breach Resonates** The Inotiv breach is not an isolated IT failure but a symptom of systemic vulnerabilities within high-stakes industries: * **Strategic Targeting of Life Sciences:** Attackers increasingly focus on pharmaceutical and research organizations due to their valuable intellectual property, sensitive human trial data, and pressing operational timelines, which may increase pressure to pay ransoms. * **The "Double Extortion" Playbook:** Qilin's method—encrypting systems *and* stealing data—represents the now-standard double-extortion model. The threat of leaking sensitive health data adds a powerful layer of coercion against a HIPAA-regulated entity. * **The Expanding Surface of Third-Party Risk:** As a Contract Research Organization (CRO), Inotiv is a vital third-party partner to numerous pharmaceutical companies. This breach exposes the cascading risk within the industry's ecosystem, where a compromise at one service provider can threaten the security posture of multiple major firms. The incident has already triggered investigations by plaintiff's law firms for potential class-action litigation, citing possible failures to implement adequate cybersecurity measures. This legal aftermath, combined with regulatory scrutiny, will define the long-term cost of the breach far beyond the initial ransom demand. *For individuals notified by Inotiv, cybersecurity experts strongly recommend enrolling in the offered credit monitoring, placing fraud alerts with national credit bureaus, and remaining vigilant against sophisticated phishing attempts that may leverage the stolen personal data.*

loading..   05-Dec-2025
loading..   4 min read
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Mixpanel

A hidden Mixpanel breach exposes sensitive user analytics and raises serious que...

Mixpanel, one of the most widely embedded product analytics platforms in the SaaS ecosystem, confirmed a security incident that has rapidly escalated into a broader industry concern. What initially appeared to be a limited intrusion has evolved into a significant exposure event, revealing how deeply analytics services are embedded in modern architectures — and how vulnerable the ecosystem becomes when a telemetry provider is compromised. An unauthorized actor gained access to part of Mixpanel’s environment and exported a dataset containing identifiable analytics information. While the company stated that no passwords or payment data were exposed, the leaked set included names, emails, IP-derived geolocation, device metadata, and behavioral telemetry. In theory, this is “low-sensitivity.” In practice, it is the raw material for targeted phishing, identity profiling, and social-engineering attacks — a pattern well documented by organizations such as **[CISA](https://www.cisa.gov)** and **[ENISA](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirt-cert-services)**. ## **A Breach Rooted in Human Error — and Predictable Attack Patterns** The attack was triggered by a smishing message that deceived an internal user. Smishing has become a primary initial-access vector, with global trends highlighted by the **[Verizon’s Data Breach Investigations Report](https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/dbir/)**, which shows social engineering as the leading attack category for enterprise compromise. Once the attacker obtained session access, they used Mixpanel’s analytics export functionality to pull a curated dataset. This was not a chaotic grab; the extraction showed precision, aligning with the attacker behavior patterns described in **[Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence reports](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/microsoft-threat-intelligence)** — attackers increasingly prefer targeted reconnaissance over noisy exfiltration. Mixpanel revoked access, rotated credentials, and engaged incident-response specialists, following industry incident-handling practices such as those outlined in **[NIST’s Computer Security Incident Handling Guide](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-61/rev-2/final)**. But delays in customer notification highlight a persistent problem across the SaaS supply chain: the absence of real-time transparency when a vendor is breached. ## **Why “Low-Sensitivity” Telemetry is a Myth** Telemetry pipelines now collect a blend of identifiers, metadata, and event-level behavior. Individually, none of these fields seem dangerous. Together, they form high-resolution attack intelligence. * **Email address + device type** enables tailored phishing templates. * **Location + browsing environment** helps adversaries mimic trusted service alerts. * **Behavioral event logs** provide timing patterns for credential-harvesting attacks. Threat groups have repeatedly used such contextual profiling in major campaigns documented by **[Mandiant](https://www.mandiant.com/resources)** and **[CrowdStrike](https://www.crowdstrike.com/threat-intelligence/)**. The broader security community has long warned that metadata — not just passwords or financial data — fuels sophisticated intrusion workflows. The Mixpanel breach validates that position. ## **OpenAI’s Containment Strategy Shows How Critical This Exposure Is** OpenAI, one of Mixpanel’s high-visibility customers, immediately severed all telemetry integrations once notified. Although the leaked data concerned mainly API-level analytics rather than ChatGPT logs or credentials, OpenAI treated the situation as a material security incident. This aligns with best practices emphasized by **[NIST’s Zero Trust Architecture](https://www.nist.gov/publications/zero-trust-architecture)**: assume breach, compartmentalize, and remove unnecessary trust paths. Telemetry providers are deeply embedded in core workflows — and once compromised, they become a propagation vector for further attacks. ## **A Supply Chain Built on Implicit Trust** The Mixpanel exposure points to wider systemic issues. ### **1. Overprivileged Telemetry Pipelines** Many organizations give analytics vendors unrestricted event access. Research by **[OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)** repeatedly highlights excessive data collection as a critical weakness. ### **2. Export Functions With Weak Guardrails** Bulk data export should require multi-party approval or privileged workflows, a principle supported by frameworks like **[ISO 27001](https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html)**. Yet many SaaS analytics dashboards allow single-click extraction of large datasets. ### **3. Insufficient Monitoring of Vendor Activity** Organizations often fail to track what vendors are accessing or exporting — a risk repeatedly stressed in **[Gartner’s Third-Party Risk Insights](https://www.gartner.com/en)**. ### **4. Vulnerable Notification Windows** Delays in vendor breach disclosure cut into the critical window where organizations can reset credentials or warn users. This is a recurring issue seen across recent supply-chain attacks documented by **[SANS ICS reports](https://www.sans.org/ics/)**. ## **What Organizations Must Do Immediately** To prevent analytics-driven supply-chain breaches, enterprises must adopt stricter governance: ### **Audit Telemetry Streams** Follow data-minimization principles aligned with **[GDPR Article 5](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-5-gdpr/)** and remove unnecessary identifiers such as emails or full IPs. ### **Require Phishing-Resistant MFA** Adopt hardware-key or certificate-based authentication as recommended by **[FIDO Alliance](https://fidoalliance.org/)** for any admin-facing analytics system. ### **Restrict Export Capabilities** Bulk exports should: * require elevated roles, * be logged immutably, * support anomaly alerts, * and use approval workflows similar to **[SOC 2 controls](https://www.aicpa-cima.com/resources/article/aicpasocsuite)**. ### **Continuously Monitor Vendor Behavior** Organizations should require vendors to provide access logs, export logs, and anomaly alerts, aligning with best practices outlined by **[CSA’s Cloud Controls Matrix](https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/cloud-controls-matrix)**. ### **Rebuild Vendor Contracts** Contracts should enforce: * strict least-privilege data handling, * data residency guarantees, * breach notification SLAs, * and external security audits guided by **[NIST 800-53](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53/rev-5/final)**. Analytics platforms were once considered harmless reporting tools. Today, they function as shadow identity providers, session observers, and behavioral data aggregators — precisely the kind of systems adversaries want to compromise. Unless companies adopt rigorous telemetry governance, breaches like this will become routine.

loading..   04-Dec-2025
loading..   5 min read
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Wordpress

Critical WordPress Plugin Flaws Threaten Tens of Thousands of Sites...

A coordinated surge of exploit activity targeting two high-impact WordPress plugin vulnerabilities has put more than 110,000 websites at immediate risk of full compromise. The vulnerabilities — an **unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE)** flaw in **Advanced Custom Fields: Extended (ACF Extended)** and an **unauthenticated administrator-creation exploit** in **King Addons for Elementor** — dramatically escalate the threat surface for WordPress sites across industries. Both flaws are **zero-click**, **no-authentication**, and **weaponized in the wild**, making them among the most critical WordPress threats disclosed this year. ## **1. ACF Extended RCE (100,000+ Sites): A Silent Execution Vector With Server-Level Reach** The vulnerability in **ACF Extended** emerged from a code path inside the plugin’s form preparation routine. A non-privileged actor can inject arbitrary parameters into a function that is eventually passed through PHP's `call_user_func_array()`, enabling the **direct execution of attacker-controlled code on the hosting server**. ### **Technical Breakdown** * Vulnerable versions: **0.9.0.5 → 0.9.1.1** * Attack complexity: **Low**, no authentication required * Exploit vector: **Manipulated input passed to a dynamic function call** * Impact: * Execution of arbitrary PHP * Webshell deployment * Database extraction * Persistent backdoor installation * Privilege escalation via rogue admin creation This flaw effectively collapses the boundary between WordPress and the underlying server, allowing attackers to pivot from web-level access to complete system-level dominance. ### **Threat Intelligence Summary** Analysis of similar code-execution chains shows that adversaries typically follow a predictable pattern: 1. **Initial probe** via automated scanners 2. **Payload injection** through malformed form submission 3. **Webshell deployment** disguised inside media directories 4. **Admin account insertion** as redundancy 5. **Lateral movement** into hosting environment 6. **Monetization stage**, such as cryptojacking, phishing pages, or SEO poisoning Version **0.9.2** patches the flaw, but telemetry indicates that a high percentage of active installations remain outdated. ## **2. King Addons for Elementor: Administrator Takeover Under Active Exploitation** The second threat originates from a privilege-handling failure inside the **King Addons** AJAX registration module. By design, user role assignment should be enforced on the server. Instead, the plugin accepts the `user_role` parameter **directly from the client**, enabling attackers to register themselves as **administrators**. Because the entire operation is executed through `admin-ajax.php`, no authentication is required. ### **Technical Breakdown** * Vulnerable versions: **24.12.92 → 51.1.14** * Fixed version: **51.1.35** * CVSS score: **9.8 Critical** * Attack requirement: **None (unauthenticated)** This flaw provides attackers a **frictionless route to full site control**, including: * Plugin/theme modification * Database access * Arbitrary file uploads * Placement of phishing frameworks * Ransomware staging * Injection of SEO spam across pages ### **Active Exploitation Indicators** Threat groups began abusing the flaw almost immediately after disclosure. Recorded exploit activity includes: * **Tens of thousands of automated POST requests** targeting registration endpoints * Waves of **newly created admin accounts**, often with usernames like `wp-admin-new`, `system-user`, or random strings * Uploads of obfuscated PHP droppers to `/wp-content/uploads/` * Redirect injections funneling traffic to tech-support scams or crypto-fraud sites This vulnerability is already functioning as an entry point in **large-scale botnet campaigns**, indicating its widespread abuse. ## **3. Combined Threat Impact: Systemic Risk to the WordPress Ecosystem** These two vulnerabilities, though distinct in nature, share a dangerous alignment: * **Both allow full compromise with zero authentication.** * **Both integrate cleanly into automated exploit frameworks.** * **Both enable post-exploitation persistence**, making detection challenging. * **Both affect high-usage plugins with weak update hygiene.** In technical terms, these vulnerabilities offer two of the most valuable primitives in exploitation: * **RCE (ACF Extended)** → Control the server * **Privilege escalation (King Addons)** → Control the CMS When used together, they form a **complete compromise chain** capable of collapsing an entire digital infrastructure. This has substantial implications for: * eCommerce storefronts * Membership sites * Marketing funnels * SME corporate websites * Agencies hosting multiple client installations * Managed WordPress service providers ## **4. Risk Modeling: What Attackers Gain From Exploiting These Flaws** ### **High-Value Attack Outcomes** | Attack Goal | Achieved Through | | ---------------------------------------- | ----------------------- | | Full administrative takeover | King Addons | | Server command execution | ACF Extended | | Data theft / DB extraction | Both | | Ransomware payload delivery | ACF Extended | | SEO spam / malicious redirect injections | Both | | Email phishing infrastructure deployment | King Addons | | Botnet node recruitment | ACF Extended (post-RCE) | ### **Operational Use Cases for Attackers** * **Mass infection campaigns** against WordPress clusters * **Cryptomining operations** using server resources * **Malvertising & traffic hijacking networks** * **Credential harvesting (SMTP, DB credentials)** * **Supply-chain poisoning** of themes and plugins stored on compromised sites ## **5. Forensic Indicators Suggesting Compromise** Administrators should immediately investigate if they observe: ### **Indicators of RCE (ACF Extended)** * Unknown PHP files in `/uploads/` or `/wp-includes/` * Sudden file permission changes * CPU spikes (cryptomining behavior) * Suspicious POST traffic to form-related endpoints * Irregular entries in Apache/Nginx logs ### **Indicators of Admin Takeover (King Addons)** * New admin users created without authorization * Requests to `admin-ajax.php?action=register_user` with role manipulation * Modified `.htaccess` or injected JavaScript blocks * Unexpected plugin installations * Redirect loops or injected iframe payloads ## **6. Immediate Remediation Checklist** ### **Patch Immediately** * ACF Extended → **0.9.2+** * King Addons → **51.1.35+** ### **Then Conduct These Steps** 1. Disable vulnerable plugins if patching is delayed. 2. Audit all admin accounts. 3. Change database and wp-admin credentials. 4. Regenerate salts in `wp-config.php`. 5. Scan entire installation for injected PHP. 6. Restore from a trusted backup if compromise is detected. 7. Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF). 8. Enforce 2FA and strict role assignments. ## **7. Long-Term Hardening Strategy** To reduce exposure to similar threats: * Limit plugin count to essential, verified extensions. * Use managed update pipelines (e.g., CI/CD for WordPress). * Enforce minimal permissions on file system and database. * Use server-level isolation for multi-tenant hosting environments. * Implement continuous threat monitoring and integrity checks. WordPress doesn’t fail because it’s insecure — it fails because its **plugin ecosystem is porous, fragmented, and inconsistently maintained**. These two vulnerabilities exemplify how quickly a neglected update can escalate into a full-scale compromise. The dual emergence of an RCE flaw and a privilege-escalation flaw in popular WordPress plugins signals a critical moment for the ecosystem. Attackers no longer rely on brute force or credential stuffing — they exploit **logic flaws**, **unsafe developer assumptions**, and **update fatigue**.

loading..   04-Dec-2025
loading..   6 min read