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RCE

Bluetooth

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PerfektBlue Bluetooth Flaws Expose Millions of Vehicles to Remote Hack

PerfektBlue vulnerabilities in OpenSynergy's BlueSDK enable one-click remote code execution on Mercedes, Volkswagen, and Skoda infotainment systems..

12-Jul-2025
4 min read

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Aviation

Qantas faces a massive data breach exposing millions. Discover the latest update...

Qantas confirmed a major cyberattack that compromised the personal data of **5.7 million customers**. The breach was traced to a third-party platform used by Qantas’ Manila call centre, highlighting the risks inherent in global outsourcing and third-party data handling. This incident is not just a story of numbers, but a wake-up call for the aviation industry and its customers. ### What Was Stolen? Qantas’ forensic analysis revealed a nuanced picture of the breach, with the type and depth of data exposure varying significantly among customers: - **4 million customers**: Exposed data included tier names, email addresses, and Frequent Flyer details. - Of these, **1.2 million** records contained only a name and email address. - The remaining **2.8 million** included Frequent Flyer numbers, and in some cases, membership tier, points balance, or Status Credits. - **1.7 million customers**: Suffered a broader exposure, with combinations of the above and at least one of the following: - Residential or business address (**1.3 million**) - Date of birth (**1.1 million**) - Phone number (**900,000**) - Gender (**400,000**) - Meal preference (**10,000**) Notably, **no passwords, login details, or PINs** were compromised, and Qantas’ core systems remained unaffected. However, the exposed data is still highly valuable to scammers, especially for social engineering attacks. ### How the Breach Unfolded - The breach was linked to Qantas’ Manila call centre, but the airline operates call centres globally. Anyone who interacted with the Manila centre may be affected. - Qantas has been contacted by a “potential cybercriminal,” and the Australian Federal Police are involved to verify the legitimacy of this contact. - CEO Vanessa Hudson declined to comment on ransom demands, reflecting the sensitive and evolving nature of the incident. ### Customer Communication and Support - **Direct Notification**: From July 9, Qantas began emailing affected customers, specifying which data fields were compromised. This process is expected to be completed within 24 to 48 hours. - **Support Hotline**: Qantas established a 24/7 cyber support hotline, offering specialist identity protection advice. Interestingly, most hotline calls are routed to an overseas call centre in the UK, underscoring the global scale of the response. - **Compensation**: As of now, Qantas has not confirmed any compensation (such as Qantas Points or flight credits), but has not ruled it out. Customers are advised to monitor official communications for updates. ### Uncommon and Overlooked Angles #### 1. Third-Party Risk and Global Outsourcing The breach’s origin in a third-party Manila call centre platform exposes the vulnerabilities of global outsourcing. It raises questions about data sovereignty, oversight, and the security standards of international partners—issues that are often overlooked until a crisis emerges. #### 2. The Social Engineering Threat While no passwords were stolen, the combination of names, emails, addresses, and even meal preferences provides a rich toolkit for scammers. The risk is not just identity theft, but highly targeted phishing and social engineering attacks, where fraudsters can convincingly pose as Qantas staff. #### 3. Transparency and Real-Time Response Qantas’ approach—rapid forensic analysis, direct customer notification, and public updates—sets a new standard for transparency in the wake of a breach. The airline’s willingness to detail the types of data exposed, and its ongoing communication, may help rebuild trust, but also sets expectations for future incidents across the industry. #### 4. Ransom Dilemma The involvement of a “potential cybercriminal” and the refusal to comment on ransom demands highlight the complex decisions companies face in the aftermath of a breach. The interplay between law enforcement, corporate policy, and criminal actors remains a murky and evolving landscape. ### What’s Next? Security Measures and Customer Vigilance Qantas has implemented several new security measures: - Additional controls on Frequent Flyer accounts, including stricter identification for account changes. - Restricted access to the compromised third-party platform. - Enhanced system monitoring and detection for unusual activity. Customers are urged to remain vigilant, especially against scams leveraging the leaked data. Qantas recommends verifying the authenticity of emails (using DKIM and DMARC checks in Gmail) and never providing personal or payment details to unsolicited contacts—even if they appear legitimate. The Qantas data breach is a stark reminder that in a hyper-connected world, the weakest link can be anywhere in the global supply chain. The incident’s uncommon angles—third-party risk, the social engineering threat, and the transparency of Qantas’ response—offer critical lessons for businesses and consumers alike.

loading..   11-Jul-2025
loading..   4 min read
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Social Engineering

M&S confirms a massive ransomware attack began with a social engineering breach,...

Marks & Spencer (M&S), one of the UK’s largest retailers, has confirmed that a sophisticated social engineering attack was the initial vector for a major ransomware incident in April 2025. The breach, attributed to the DragonForce ransomware group, resulted in the encryption of critical systems and the theft of approximately 150GB of sensitive data. The attack underscores the growing threat of impersonation tactics and the risks associated with third-party service providers. ## How the Attack Unfolded ### Sophisticated Impersonation - The breach began on April 17, 2025, when attackers impersonated an M&S employee to trick a third-party help desk into resetting a password. - The attackers used detailed personal information to convincingly pose as a legitimate staff member, a method described by M&S chairman Archie Norman as “sophisticated impersonation.” - The third-party involved was Tata Consultancy Services, which provides IT help desk support for M&S. Tata is believed to have been manipulated into resetting the password, granting attackers access to the M&S network. ### Entry to Ransomware Deployment - Once inside, the attackers deployed DragonForce ransomware, a group believed to operate out of Asia but distinct from the similarly named hacktivist group “DragonForce Malaysia.” - The attack was linked to threat actors associated with Scattered Spider, who have a history of leveraging social engineering for initial access. ## Impact and Response ### Double-Extortion Tactics - The ransomware encrypted numerous VMware ESXi servers, disrupting M&S operations. - Approximately 150GB of data was stolen, with the attackers threatening to publish the data if a ransom was not paid—a classic double-extortion approach. - M&S proactively shut down all systems to contain the attack, but the encryption and data theft had already occurred. ### Ransom Negotiations - M&S leadership decided not to engage directly with the attackers, instead relying on professional ransomware negotiators. - When questioned about ransom payments, M&S declined to provide details, citing public interest and ongoing cooperation with the National Crime Agency (NCA) and authorities. - As of the latest update, the stolen data has not appeared on DragonForce’s leak site, suggesting either a ransom was paid or negotiations are ongoing. ## Key Lessons and Security Implications ### Third-Party and Social Engineering Risks - The attack highlights the vulnerability of large organizations to social engineering, especially when third-party vendors are involved in critical support roles. - Even with advanced technical defenses, human factors and supply chain partners remain a significant risk vector. ### Ransomware Trends - DragonForce’s use of double-extortion tactics is now standard among major ransomware groups. - The incident demonstrates the importance of rapid response, professional negotiation, and transparent communication with authorities.

loading..   10-Jul-2025
loading..   3 min read
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Android

Anatsa Android banking trojan infiltrates Google Play, hits 90k US/Canada users ...

The **Anatsa (a.k.a. TeaBot)** Android banking trojan has launched its first large-scale campaign in the United States and Canada, hiding inside a popular “Document Viewer – File Reader” app on Google Play. The dropper accumulated roughly **90,000 installs in six weeks** before Google removed it, providing attackers with a foothold to steal credentials, keylog sessions, and automate fraudulent transactions against a broadened list of North American financial apps. ThreatFabric analysts say the campaign mirrors five earlier European waves, yet shows a sharper focus on U.S. institutions and improved evasion tactics, such as deceptive maintenance overlays that mask fraud in real-time. ## Anatsa at a Glance | Attribute | Details | |-----------|---------| | First seen | 2020 | | Aliases | TeaBot, Toddler | | Primary vector | Google Play droppers (PDF, QR, cleaner, file viewers) | | Targets | 650+ banking/finance apps worldwide | | Capabilities | Credential overlays, Accessibility abuse, Keylogging, On-device fraud (DTO) | Anatsa’s operators periodically pause distribution, refine the code, and then return with region-specific waves that quickly accumulate tens of thousands of installs before being taken down. ## Proven Five-Step Campaign Process ThreatFabric’s long-term telemetry shows each wave follows a consistent, **five-step pattern**: 1. **Developer profile creation** on Google Play. 2. **Legitimate utility app release** (e.g., PDF reader) to build trust and reviews. 3. **User-base growth** to reach Google Charts’ Top-Free lists, boosting visibility. 4. **Malicious update** that silently side-loads Anatsa via an external payload. 5. **Dynamic targeting**—the trojan fetches an updated list of banking package names from its C2, enabling on-the-fly expansion. This cyclic approach lets the gang bypass store vetting, exploit user ratings as social proof, and keep infections geographically tailored. ## How the North-American Dropper Worked The 2025 campaign’s dropper package **com.stellarastra.maintainer.astracontrol_managerreadercleaner** looked and behaved as a genuine file viewer until June 24. An update then added code that: * Requested **AccessibilityService** permission to automate taps. * Downloaded a second-stage DEX from the C2, loading the full Anatsa payload in memory. * Displayed a **“Scheduled Maintenance”** overlay whenever victims opened any targeted banking app—blocking calls to customer support while credentials were siphoned. ### Timeline of the U.S.–Canada Wave | Date | Milestone | |------|-----------| | 07 May 2025 | App first published on Google Play | | 29 Jun 2025 | Climbed to #4 in “Top Free – Tools” chart (US) | | 24-30 Jun 2025 | Malicious update pushed; active distribution window | | 01 Jul 2025 | Google removes app after ThreatFabric report | ## Rapid Growth of Anatsa Download Waves The North-American dropper continues a multi-year pattern of explosive install counts that outpace store defenses. ## Impacted Banking Apps and Fraud Techniques installed, Anatsa can: * **Harvest credentials** via WebView-based overlays that mimic sign-in pages. * **Intercept SMS 2FA codes** through granted accessibility hooks. * **Perform full Device-Takeover Fraud (DTO)**—initiating transfers directly from the victim’s handset to bypass behavioral analytics[6]. ThreatFabric observed **an expanded target list of U.S. institutions**, including tier-1 retail banks, credit unions, and investment apps, alongside Canadian banking brands. ## Why Tools-Category Apps Dominate Analysis by Zscaler shows **“Tools”** utilities account for 40% of droppers because they plausibly request powerful permissions (storage, accessibility) without raising suspicion. ## Google Play’s Unresolved Malware Gap Google’s policy requires any app asking for AccessibilityService to justify the need, yet Anatsa operators still bypass vetting by shipping **clean version 1.0** and weaponizing the first update—a tactic that evades automated static analysis and most manual reviews[3]. Until store workflows verify **runtime behavior** and cross-check update diffs, high-download droppers will continue to pose a recurring threat vector. ## Indicators of Compromise & Mitigation **IOC Highlights (July 2025 wave)** - Malicious PDF update domain: `menusand.com` - C2 API endpoint: `185.215.113.31:85/api` - Package name: `com.stellarastra.*reader*cleaner` **Recommended Actions for Enterprises** 1. **Block known IOCs** at MDM and network layers. 2. **Harden mobile apps** with root/jailbreak detection, certificate pinning, and overlay protection. 3. **Leverage Play Integrity API** to spot modified or repackaged environments. 4. **Deploy behavioral fraud analytics** capable of detecting DTO patterns (e.g., anomalous device biometrics, impossible timing). 5. **Educate customers**: limit installs to trusted vendors, revoke unnecessary permissions, enable Play Protect scans. ## Strategic Take-aways for Banks & Developers | Risk Driver | Strategic Response | |-------------|-------------------| | Dropper stealth via staged updates | Continuous mobile-app telemetry, store-update diff scanning | | Accessibility abuse for DTO | In-app detection of suspicious accessibility events; enforce step-up verification | | Overlay credential theft | Implement secure keyboard frameworks and deep-link sign-in to thwart overlays | | Geo-targeted target lists | Monitor for sudden spikes in fraud from specific mobile OS versions or locales | | Store takedown lag | Maintain threat-intel feeds and warn users faster than official store actions | The latest **Anatsa incursion into North America** underscores the persistent gap between official-store defenses and agile malware operators.

loading..   09-Jul-2025
loading..   4 min read