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DDoS Attack

Azure

Asia

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Microsoft Azure DDoS protection platform mitigated a record breaking 3.47 Tbps DDoS attack

Asian Azure customers targeted by one of the largest DDoS attack of all time reported at 3.47 Tbps with a packet rate of 340 million pps...

28-Jan-2022
4 min read

No content available.

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Exploit

TigerJack's malicious VS Code extensions, like C++ Playground & HTTP Format, ste...

A threat actor known as **TigerJack** has been systematically infiltrating developer marketplaces with malicious Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extensions, creating a sophisticated attack infrastructure that steals source code, hijacks system resources for cryptocurrency mining, and establishes remote backdoors for complete system control. This ongoing campaign highlights a critical and escalating threat to the software supply chain, leveraging the trust developers place in popular IDE marketplaces. ### Malicious Extension Arsenal TigerJack operates a coordinated multi-account campaign across at least three publisher identities (`ab-498`, `498`, and `498-00`), deploying at least 11 malicious extensions. The most successful ones, "C++ Playground" and "HTTP Format," infected over **17,000 developers** before being removed from the Microsoft Marketplace, though they remain available on the open-source **OpenVSX registry** (used by Cursor, Windsurf, and other VS Code-compatible IDEs). The attack employs a "Trojan Horse" strategy: the extensions function as advertised to avoid suspicion while malicious code runs invisibly in the background. | Extension Name | Primary Malicious Function | Key Technique | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **C++ Playground** | Source code theft | Exfiltrates C++ code via document change listener | | **HTTP Format** | Cryptocurrency mining | Runs CoinIMP miner with hardcoded credentials | | **cppplayground, httpformat, pythonformat** | Remote Code Execution (Backdoor) | Fetches & executes remote JavaScript payloads every 20 minutes | ### A Multi-Faceted Attack on Developers 1. **Real-Time Source Code Theft**: The "C++ Playground" extension uses an `onDidChangeTextDocument` listener that activates 500 milliseconds after a keystroke, capturing and exfiltrating complete C++ source files in near-real-time to multiple remote servers. The stolen code, often containing proprietary algorithms and intellectual property, is packaged into JSON payloads and sent to endpoints like `https://ab498.pythonanywhere.com/test4`. 2. **Cryptojacking and System Hijacking**: "HTTP Format" secretly runs a **CoinIMP miner**, using hardcoded API credentials to monopolize CPU resources. This causes noticeable performance issues like constant fan noise and system lag, which developers often mistake for hardware or software problems. The threat actor can monitor mining progress and withdraw mined cryptocurrency directly. 3. **Persistent Remote Backdoor**: The most dangerous extensions establish a **persistent backdoor** that polls a remote server (`https://ab498.pythonanywhere.com/static/in4.js`) every 20 minutes for new commands. Using JavaScript's `eval()` function on the fetched code, TigerJack can dynamically push any malicious payload without updating the extension. This allows for: * Stealing credentials and API keys * Deploying ransomware * Using developer machines as entry points into corporate networks * Injecting backdoors into software projects ### A Persistent & Evolving Threat TigerJack demonstrates high persistence. As recently as September 2025, the actor launched a coordinated republication campaign, repackaging the same malicious code under the new "498-00" publisher account. This occurred even as the investigation was ongoing, proving the operation's sophistication. This campaign is part of a broader trend of attacks targeting developers through their tools. Recent incidents include a malicious dependency in the **"Material Theme"** that impacted nearly 4 million users, a cryptojacking campaign impersonating popular tools like **"Prettier"** and **"Discord Rich Presence"**, and a supply chain attack on the **"Ethcode"** extension via a malicious pull request. ### How to Protect Your Development Environment For individual developers and organizations, vigilance and proactive security measures are critical: * **Vet Extensions and Publishers**: Only install extensions from verified, well-known publishers. Scrutinize the publisher's name, history, and other extensions. * **Practice Least Privilege**: Grant extensions only the minimum permissions they require. Regularly audit installed extensions and revoke access for those no longer in use. * **Monitor System Performance**: Unexplained high CPU usage or system slowdown could indicate a hidden cryptominer. * **Use Security Tools**: Consider community-built security scanners like **ExtensionTotal** that can detect malicious or risky extensions before they cause harm. * **Maintain Visibility**: Organizations should have visibility into third-party vendors and tools integrated into their development environment, as limited visibility is a major risk factor. The TigerJack campaign serves as a stark reminder that the very tools intended to boost productivity can become potent weapons in the hands of threat actors. As the attack vector evolves, a shift from blind trust to verified security becomes not just prudent, but essential for safeguarding intellectual property and infrastructure.

loading..   15-Oct-2025
loading..   4 min read
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CLOP

Zero Day

Critical Oracle E-Business Suite flaws CVE-2025-61882 and CVE-2025-61884 were ex...

The enterprise software landscape is facing a significant security crisis following the discovery of two critical vulnerabilities in **Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS)**. The situation escalated when a vulnerability patched in early October, **CVE-2025-61882**, was exploited as a zero-day by threat actors linked to the **CL0P extortion group**, leading to a widespread data theft and extortion campaign affecting dozens of organizations . Oracle has since issued another emergency alert for a separate, high-severity flaw, **CVE-2025-61884**, warning that it could allow unauthenticated attackers to access sensitive data. This one-two punch has placed organizations relying on the popular enterprise resource planning platform at severe risk, underscoring the critical need for immediate patching and robust security measures. ## CVE-2025-61882 and CVE-2025-61884 ### Technical Specifications at a Glance The following table breaks down the key characteristics of the two recently disclosed Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerabilities: | **Characteristic** | **CVE-2025-61882** | **CVE-2025-61884** | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **CVSS v3.1 Score** | 9.8 (Critical) | 7.5 (High) | | **Attack Vector** | Network | Network | | **Authentication Required** | No | No | | **Primary Impact** | Remote Code Execution | Unauthorized Data Access | | **Affected Component** | Oracle Concurrent Processing (BI Publisher Integration) | Oracle Configurator (Runtime UI) | | **Affected Versions** | 12.2.3 through 12.2.14 | 12.2.3 through 12.2.14 | ### Technical Mechanism of Attack The critical vulnerability **CVE-2025-61882** has been the primary vector for the ongoing extortion campaign. Analysis from CrowdStrike and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) reveals a sophisticated, multi-stage exploit chain. The attack begins with an **authentication bypass**, initiated by a malicious `POST` request to the `/OA_HTML/SyncServlet` endpoint. Once access is gained, the threat actors abuse Oracle's **XML Publisher Template Manager** to achieve code execution. They upload a malicious XSL template into the EBS database, where it is stored in the `XDO_TEMPLATES_B` table . The template's name consistently begins with the prefix `TMP` or `DEF`. The final stage involves triggering the execution of this payload by calling the Template Preview functionality, which executes the embedded commands. This technique allows the attackers to deploy web shells and other malware, establishing persistence and enabling data exfiltration. ## Extortion Campaign: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) ### CL0P's Mass Exploitation Playbook GTIG and Mandiant have attributed this campaign to a threat actor claiming affiliation with the **CL0P extortion brand**, a group notorious for mass exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in managed file transfer systems. The campaign follows a now-familiar playbook: exploit a zero-day, steal victim data, and initiate extortion attempts weeks later. The first known exploitation of CVE-2025-61882 [occurred](https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/alert-cve-2025-61882.html) as early as **August 9, 2025**, with suspicious activity dating back to July 10, 2025—weeks before a patch was available. The extortion phase began on **September 29, 2025**, when the actor launched a high-volume email campaign to executives at numerous organizations. These emails, sent from hundreds of compromised third-party accounts to bypass spam filters, alleged the theft of sensitive data from the victims' Oracle EBS environments and provided limited file listings as proof. The emails directed victims to contact `[email protected]` and `[email protected]`, addresses associated with the CL0P data leak site. ### A Sophisticated Malware Arsenal To maintain control within compromised environments, the threat actors deployed a chain of Java-based implants. These malware families are designed for in-memory execution to avoid detection on disk. Observed payloads include: * **GOLDVEIN.JAVA**: A downloader used to retrieve additional malicious components . * **SAGEGIFT, SAGELEAF, and SAGEWAVE**: A suite of tools that blend dynamic filters and template-based payload delivery through the database, facilitating stealthy operations and data exfiltration. ## A Defender's Guide ### Immediate Patching is Non-Negotiable Oracle has strongly recommended that customers apply the emergency updates for both CVE-2025-61882 and CVE-2025-61884 as soon as possible. [Link to CVE-2025-61884] (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61884). It is crucial to note that for CVE-2025-61882, the **October 2023 Critical Patch Update is a prerequisite** for applying the new security patch. Organizations should urgently review their patch levels and proceed with updates. Patches are provided for product versions covered under Premier or Extended Support phases. ### Proactive Threat Hunting and Hardening Given that exploitation may have begun months before patches were released, organizations must proactively hunt for signs of compromise. Security researchers and Oracle recommend the following actions: * **Scan for Malicious Templates**: Query the `xdo_templates_vl` database table for templates with names starting with `TMP` or `DEF` followed by 16 random hex characters . * **Monitor for IOCs**: Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs provided by Oracle, including `200[.]107[.]207[.]26` and `185[.]181[.]60[.]11` . Also, monitor for commands associated with the exploit, such as reverse shell commands . * **Inspect Session Logs**: Investigate suspicious sessions in the `icx_sessions` table, particularly for `UserID 0` (sysadmin) and `UserID 6` (guest) . * **Reduce Attack Surface**: As a temporary measure, consider disabling direct internet access to exposed Oracle EBS services and ensure instances are secured behind a web application firewall (WAF) . ## Escalating Threat to Enterprise Software This incident is part of a dangerous trend where sophisticated threat actors systematically target business-critical software. The CL0P group has repeatedly used this model with great success, having previously exploited zero-days in Accellion FTA, GoAnywhere MFT, and MOVEit Transfer. Shifting this playbook to a core enterprise platform like Oracle E-Business Suite, which manages finances, supply chains, and customer relationships for countless organizations, represents an escalation in both ambition and potential impact. The public leaking of a proof-of-concept exploit for [CVE-2025-61882](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61882) on a Telegram channel on October 3, 2025, has further heightened the threat landscape. This disclosure lowers the barrier to entry for other threat actors, making it likely that attacks will evolve from targeted exploitation to broader, opportunistic campaigns in the near future.

loading..   13-Oct-2025
loading..   5 min read
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ZeroDay

Active attacks exploit Gladinet CentreStack/Triofox zero-day (CVE-2025-11371). N...

Cybersecurity researchers are warning that a severe, unpatched vulnerability in Gladinet's popular CentreStack and Triofox file-sharing software is being actively exploited by attackers. The zero-day flaw allows unauthorized individuals to read sensitive system files and, in a sophisticated attack chain, achieve complete remote control of the affected server. The vulnerability, tracked as **CVE-2025-11371**, is an unauthenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) bug that impacts all versions of the software, including the latest release, 16.7.10368.56560. While a formal patch is still under development, a critical mitigation has been identified to prevent exploitation. #### **How It Is Being Exploited** The active attacks leverage a clever combination of a new weakness and a previously patched one. The newly discovered LFI flaw (CVE-2025-11371) allows attackers to remotely access any file on the system without needing a password. Here is a fresh version of the news article, written in plain language with a clear, standardized structure for easy reading. #### **What You Need to Know** A critical vulnerability has been discovered in widely used software, and it is currently being attacked in the wild. The table below summarizes the core details: | **Vulnerability Aspect** | **Details** | | :--- | :--- | | **CVE Identifier** | CVE-2025-11371 | | **CVSS Score** | 6.1 (Medium) | | **Type** | Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) | | **Affected Products** | Gladinet CentreStack & Triofox | | **Affected Versions** | All versions, including the latest 16.7.10368.56560 | | **Status** | Actively exploited; no patch available | The zero-day vulnerability CVE-2025-11371 is a Local File Inclusion (LFI) flaw affecting the default installation and configuration of both products, impacting all versions, including the latest release, 16.7.10368.56560. Researchers at managed cybersecurity platform Huntress detected the security issue on September 27 when a threat actor successfully exploited it to obtain a machine key and execute code remotely. A closer analysis revealed that the issue was an LFI leveraged to read the Web config and extract the machine key. This allowed the attacker to use an older deserialization vulnerability (CVE-2025-30406) and achieve remote code execution (RCE) through ViewState. The CVE-2025-30406 deserialization bug in CentreStack and Triofox was also exploited in the wild in March, due to a hardcoded machine key. An attacker knowing the key could perform RCE on an affected system.

loading..   11-Oct-2025
loading..   2 min read