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Phishing

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LA County Hit by Phishing Attack Impacting 23 Employees

Discover how a phishing attack on Los Angeles County Department of Health Services compromised sensitive data, impacting 23 employees.

26-Apr-2024
2 min read

No content available.

Related Articles

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Coinbase

Coinbase's repeat data breach exposes 97k users: Offshore contractors blamed. Id...

Cryptocurrency marketplace Coinbase faces mounting backlash after confirming hackers stole sensitive data, including passports, bank details, and Social Security numbers—from nearly 97,000 users. This breach, the **third major security incident since 2021**, exposes a reckless pattern of outsourcing critical operations to offshore contractors while lobbying against regulatory safeguards. The hackers infiltrated systems by bribing overseas support staff, a tactic reminiscent of **2021 phishing attacks** that compromised 6,000 user accounts. Unlike competitors like Binance, which invested $300 million in AI-driven threat detection this year, Coinbase has prioritized cost-cutting over robust security, critics allege. ### **"A Identity Thief’s Goldmine”** The stolen data—unmasked government IDs, transaction histories, and banking identifiers—creates lifelong risks for victims. - **Hypothetical fallout:** A leaked passport could enable fraudulent loans, home purchases, or even criminal impersonation. - **By the numbers:** 42% of crypto users report identity theft attempts post-breach (2023 CipherTrace Report). _“This isn’t just data—it’s people’s lives,”_ said *Maria Gonzalez*, a Coinbase user whose driver’s license was stolen. _“Coinbase promised security, but they sold us out.”_ ### **Empty Promises While Unanswered Questions** Coinbase [claims](https://www.coinbase.com/blog/protecting-our-customers-standing-up-to-extortionists) it will launch a U.S.-based support hub and “strengthen defenses,” but skeptics dismiss this as déjà vu. In 2022, CEO Brian Armstrong pledged a “top-to-bottom security overhaul” that ultimately failed to materialize. - **Critical gaps:** Why did offshore contractors in India and the Philippines have unfettered access to unmasked IDs without real-time monitoring? - **Regulatory defiance:** In 2023, Coinbase spent $3.8 million lobbying against SEC oversight, including rules that mandate breach disclosures within 72 hours. _“This is corporate negligence dressed as innovation,”_ said *Sen. Elizabeth Warren*, who recently accused crypto firms of _“weaponizing secrecy to evade accountability.”_ ### **How Outsourcing Fueled the Data Breach** 1. **Offshore access:** Low-cost contractors in high-risk regions accessed core systems with minimal oversight. 2. **Delayed detection:** Hackers infiltrated systems for months before Coinbase took action. 3. **Ransom gambit:** Hackers demanded $20 million, but experts warn the long-term liability for users could exceed $2 billion. _*John Carter, a former Coinbase security engineer who resigned in 2022*_, revealed: _“Leadership ignored repeated warnings about contractor vulnerabilities. Profit trumped safety.”_ ### **Crypto’s House of Cards** The breach amplifies fears that decentralized finance is a haven for lax security: - **Historical parallels:** Mt. Gox’s 2014 collapse ($460M stolen), FTX’s fraud, and now Coinbase’s systemic failures. - **Investor flight:** “This sets back institutional adoption by years,” said *Rachel Kim*, a blockchain fund manager. _“How can we trust an industry that won’t protect its users?”_

loading..   16-May-2025
loading..   3 min read
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Scattered Spider

M&S cyberattack by Scattered Spider exposes customer data; triggers 15% stock cr...

A ruthless [cyberattack](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/marks-and-spencer-hit-by-major-cyberattack-click-and-collect-services-disrupted) has ignited chaos at British retail titan Marks & Spencer (M&S), as the 140-year-old institution faces its most crippling crisis in decades. The Scattered Spider syndicate—a global hacking collective linked to audacious strikes on Caesars Entertainment and MGM Resorts—has infiltrated M&S’s defenses, plundering vast troves of customer data and triggering a 15% stock market freefall that has left investors reeling. For over three weeks, the retailer’s £1.4 billion online empire has been paralyzed, its reputation hanging by a thread, while executives wage a desperate battle to stem the bleeding. ### **How the Attack Unfolded** The nightmare began on **April 25**, when M&S abruptly halted all online orders without explanation, leaving millions of customers in the dark. Behind the scenes, cyber mercenaries linked to Scattered Spider — a shadowy syndicate of English-speaking hackers — infiltrated M&S’s systems in what insiders describe as a “surgical strike” targeting personal customer data. While M&S claims payment details and passwords were *not* compromised (as card data is outsourced to third parties), hackers accessed **names, addresses, contact information, and purchase histories** — a goldmine for identity theft and phishing schemes. The breach forced M&S to freeze its £1.4 billion e-commerce platform for over 21 days, triggering a **15% stock plunge** and wiping hundreds of millions off its market value. _“This wasn’t just a hack — it was a *financial hemorrhage*,”_ declared a City of London analyst. _“M&S’s reputation is bleeding out.”_ ### **Scattered Spider’s Global Reign of Terror** The attack has been pinned on **Scattered Spider**, a cybercrime cabal also known as **Octo Tempest** and **Muddled Libra**, whose members operate from the UK, U.S., and beyond. The group gained global notoriety in 2023 for crippling Las Vegas titans **Caesars Entertainment** and **MGM Resorts**, extracting a staggering **$15 million ransom** from Caesars in a single stroke. Sources reveal Scattered Spider’s UK wing is allegedly led by **Tyler Buchanan**, a 23-year-old tech savant from Dundee, Scotland, who operated under the alias *“Tylerb”* on encrypted platforms. Buchanan was reportedly arrested in Spain last summer and extradited to California in **April 2025** to face charges — though his alleged associates continue their rampage. Meanwhile, U.S. operations are spearheaded by **Noah Urban**, aka *“King Bob”*, a hacker linked to high-profile ransomware schemes. The group’s signature blend of **social engineering, phishing, and ransomware** has made them one of the most feared entities in cybercrime. ### **Inside the Fallout: Panic, Profits, and a Retail Giant Under Siege** As M&S races to restore systems with help from cybersecurity firm **DarkTrace**, law enforcement, and the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), questions mount over how hackers bypassed defenses at a company serving **30 million loyal customers**. **Key Revelations:** - **Customer Trust Erodes:** Despite M&S’s assurances, experts warn stolen personal data could fuel *targeted scams*. “Imagine getting a fake ‘M&S voucher’ email — that’s just the start,” said cybersecurity expert Dr. Elena Voss. - **Physical Stores Survive, But Stock Market Carnage Continues:** While M&S’s 1,000 UK stores remain open, investors are fleeing. Shares have cratered to a 12-month low, with analysts predicting long-term brand damage. - **The 2025 Extradition Twist:** Tyler Buchanan’s reported extradition timeline raises eyebrows. Legal experts question how a 2025 date aligns with his 2023 arrest — suggesting either a typo or a prolonged legal saga. ### **We Will Not Be Broken** In a fiery statement, M&S CEO Stuart Machin vowed: _“We are working tirelessly to protect our customers and emerge stronger. This attack will *not* define us.”_ The retailer has launched a 24/7 helpline for affected shoppers and pledged free credit monitoring. Yet critics accuse M&S of downplaying risks. _“Calling this ‘sophisticated’ is corporate jargon for *‘we were outsmarted*,’”_ snapped retail analyst Priya Kapoor. The M&S debacle underscores a chilling reality: no company, however venerable, is safe from Scattered Spider’s evolving tactics. With ties to Russia’s ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware group, the gang epitomizes the borderless, mercenary nature of modern cyberwarfare.

loading..   14-May-2025
loading..   4 min read
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NPM

RAT

Researchers uncover a sophisticated npm supply chain attack targeting the deprec...

On May 5, 2025, security firm Aikido [detected](https://www.aikido.dev/blog/catching-a-rat-remote-access-trojian-rand-user-agent-supply-chain-compromise) unauthorized malicious versions of the **`rand-user-agent`** npm package, a once-popular library (45k weekly downloads) used to generate randomized user-agent strings for web scraping and testing. Threat actors exploited its semi-abandoned status to inject a **Remote Access Trojan (RAT)** via versions `1.0.110`, `2.0.83`, and `2.0.84`, bypassing GitHub's source code repository and targeting npm artifacts directly. ### **Technical Anatomy of the Attack** #### **1. Malicious Code Injection** - **File**: Obfuscated payload hidden in `dist/index.js`, visible only via horizontal scrolling on npm’s UI. - **Obfuscation Layers**: - **String Shuffling**: A custom `pHg` function rearranged characters to evade static analysis. - **Multi-Stage Execution**: Decrypted malicious payloads via nested functions (`zlJ`, `fqw`). - **Dynamic Imports**: Used `global["r"] = require` to bypass dependency checks. #### **2. Payload Execution** - **Persistence Mechanism**: - Created `~/.node_modules` in the user’s home directory. - Modified `module.paths` to prioritize this directory, enabling sideloading of malicious dependencies (`axios`, `socket.io-client`). - **C2 Infrastructure**: - **Socket.IO Server**: `http://85.239.62[.]36:3306` (command delivery). - **File Exfiltration**: `http://85.239.62[.]36:27017/u/f` (HTTP POST). - **Data Harvesting**: Transmitted system fingerprints: ```plaintext Hostname: [Victim Hostname] Username: [Current User] OS Type: [Windows/Linux/macOS] UUID: [Generated via crypto.randomBytes] ``` #### **3. RAT Capabilities** | **Command** | **Function** | |--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------| | `cd <path>` | Change working directory. | | `ss_dir` | Reset directory to the script’s original path. | | `ss_fcd:<path>` | Force-change directory (bypass permissions). | | `ss_upf:f,d` | Upload file `f` to destination `d` (e.g., `ss_upf:passwords.txt,/exfil`). | | `ss_upd:d,dest` | Upload all files in directory `d` to `dest`. | | `ss_stop` | Halt ongoing file transfers. | | **Any shell cmd** | Execute arbitrary commands via `child_process.exec()`. | - **Windows-Specific Hijacking**: Prepended `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Python\Python3127` to `PATH`, enabling execution of malicious binaries masquerading as Python tools. ### **Attack Vector: How the Package Was Compromised** - **Compromised npm Token**: Attackers used an **outdated automation token** from a maintainer, lacking 2FA, to publish malicious versions directly to npm. - **Version Spoofing**: Incremented version numbers (`2.0.82` → `2.0.83/2.0.84`) to mimic legitimacy. - **GitHub Decoupling**: Malicious code existed **only in npm artifacts**; GitHub repo remained untouched, delaying detection. ### **Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)** - **Malicious Versions**: `1.0.110`, `2.0.83`, `2.0.84`. - **Network Activity**: - `85.239.62.36:3306` (TCP, C2 socket). - `85.239.62.36:27017/u/f` (HTTP POST, file uploads). - **File System Artifacts**: - `~/.node_modules` (hidden directory). - `node_modules/rand-user-agent/dist/index.js` (obfuscated payload). - **Processes**: Unusual `child_process.exec()` activity or Python3127-related paths in `PATH`. ### **Mitigation & Remediation: Immediate Actions** #### **1. For Affected Systems** - **Step 1**: Identify installed versions: ```bash npm list rand-user-agent ``` If versions `1.0.110`, `2.0.83`, or `2.0.84` are present: - **Step 2**: Uninstall the package: ```bash npm uninstall rand-user-agent ``` - **Step 3**: Audit system for: - Files under `~/.node_modules`. - Unauthorized connections to `85.239.62.36`. - Unusual processes spawned from `node` or `python`. #### **2. Long-Term Security Enhancements** - **Enforce 2FA for npm**: ```bash npm profile enable-2fa auth-and-writes ``` - **Scope Automation Tokens**: Limit tokens to specific packages/IP ranges. - **Adopt Forked Alternatives**: Switch to actively maintained forks like `random-user-agent-generator`. ### **Developer Statement: Lessons from the Breach** In a comment, the maintainers clarified: > *“The attacker exploited an outdated token without 2FA. We’ve since invalidated all legacy tokens, enforced 2FA, and will implement automated npm-GitHub version parity checks.”*

loading..   12-May-2025
loading..   3 min read