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InvisiMole Hackers

InvisiMole Hackers are Targetting High-Profile Military and Diplomatic Entities

21-Jun-2020
3 min read

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Wordpress

Critical WordPress Plugin Flaws Threaten Tens of Thousands of Sites...

Security researchers have recently uncovered two severe vulnerabilities affecting popular WordPress plugins — one enabling remote code execution (RCE) and the other facilitating full administrative takeover. The flaws lie in widely used add-ons: Advanced Custom Fields: Extended (ACF Extended) and King Addons for Elementor. Immediate action is strongly recommended for any site running these plugins. ## Remote Code Execution in ACF Extended — 100,000+ Sites at Risk A major security issue has been identified in ACF Extended versions 0.9.0.5 through 0.9.1.1. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-13486, allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server simply by sending a crafted request. ([Wordfence][1]) * The root cause is unsafe input handling: user-supplied data is passed into a `call_user_func_array()` invocation without adequate sanitization or validation. ([Wordfence][1]) * This makes it possible to drop backdoors or arbitrary files onto the server, or to escalate privileges — for instance by creating new administrative accounts. ([Wordfence][1]) * Given ACF Extended’s widespread use, more than 100,000 WordPress installations are potentially vulnerable. ([Wordfence][1]) The maintainers responded quickly: a fixed version — 0.9.2 — was released on November 21, 2025. ([businessabc.net][2]) For added defense, the security firm Wordfence rolled out a firewall rule for its Premium, Care, and Response customers on November 20, 2025. ([businessabc.net][2]) **Recommendation:** If your site uses ACF Extended, update to version 0.9.2 (or later) immediately. If an immediate upgrade isn’t feasible, consider disabling the plugin until patched. --- ## Privilege Escalation in King Addons — Full Site Takeover in Active Exploits In a separate but equally serious alert, Wordfence disclosed a critical vulnerability in King Addons for Elementor, tagged CVE-2025-8489. This bug allows unauthenticated attackers to create new administrator accounts by manipulating the user role during registration. ([Wordfence][3]) ### Technical Details * The flaw is located in the plugin’s AJAX registration handler (function `handle_register_ajax()`). Rather than enforcing a safe default role (like “subscriber”), the code accepts a `user_role` parameter supplied by the user — even “administrator.” ([Security Online][4]) * An attacker can exploit this by sending a crafted POST request to `/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php`, setting `user_role=administrator`. No prior access or authentication is required. ([Security Online][4]) * Successfully created admin accounts give full control over the site — allowing malicious file uploads, content tampering, phishing/redirection, spam injection, or other malicious actions. ([The Hacker News][5]) ### Scope and Exploitation * King Addons for Elementor is active on more than 10,000 WordPress sites. ([Wordfence][3]) * The vulnerability carries a CVSS severity of 9.8 (Critical). ([The Hacker News][5]) * A patched version — 51.1.35 — was released on September 25, 2025. ([The Hacker News][5]) * According to Wordfence telemetry, exploitation began almost immediately — starting October 31, 2025 — with attacks quickly escalating thereafter. ([Wordfence][3]) * So far, more than 48,400 exploit attempts have been blocked by Wordfence. Top offending IP addresses include 45.61.157.120 (≈28,900 attempts) and 2602:fa59:3:424::1 (≈16,900 attempts), among others. ([Security Online][4]) --- ## Implications for WordPress Site Owners Between these two vulnerabilities, the risk to WordPress sites in December 2025 is exceptionally high. Both flaws require **no authentication** and allow deep compromise: * The ACF Extended bug enables remote code execution — letting attackers run arbitrary server-side code. * The King Addons flaw enables full admin takeover, allowing modifications to site structure, content, and backdoor installation. Given their severity and ease of exploitation, these are not merely theoretical — both are being actively weaponized. --- ## Recommended Actions — What You Should Do Right Now 1. **Audit your WordPress installation.** Check if you are using ACF Extended (versions 0.9.0.5–0.9.1.1) or King Addons for Elementor (pre-51.1.35). 2. **Update immediately** — ACF Extended to 0.9.2 or later; King Addons to 51.1.35 (or newer). 3. **If patching is not possible right away, disable the plugins until patched.** 4. **Review user accounts** — look for recently created administrator accounts, especially around late October to early December 2025. 5. **Scan for malicious files** — check for new or modified files in uploads, themes, and plugin directories, especially PHP files or strange backdoors. 6. **Harden WordPress installation** — implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF); enforce strong passwords; disable registration if not needed; restrict plugin use to necessary ones only. --- ## Why This Matters — The Larger Picture These incidents highlight the persistent risk posed by third-party WordPress plugins — especially ones that handle user input, registration, uploads, or dynamic features. Even a single vulnerable plugin can compromise an entire site. The speed — from disclosure to widespread exploitation within a day — underscores the urgency for site owners to keep plugins updated, maintain vigilance, and adopt a defence-in-depth posture (firewalls, monitoring, account audits, backups). In the current climate, such vulnerabilities are no longer “edge cases” — they represent a critical systemic threat to WordPress infrastructure everywhere. --- If you like, I can also produce a short “checklist for admins” version of this — a minimal, copy-paste guide summarizing exactly what to do, step by step. Want me to build one for you now? * [bleepingcomputer.com](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/critical-flaw-in-wordpress-add-on-for-elementor-exploited-in-attacks/?utm_source=chatgpt.com) * [techradar.com](https://www.techradar.com/pro/security/another-major-wordpress-add-on-security-flaw-could-affect-10-000-sites-find-out-if-youre-affected?utm_source=chatgpt.com) [1]: https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2025/12/100000-wordpress-sites-affected-by-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-advanced-custom-fields-extended-wordpress-plugin/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "100000 WordPress Sites Affected by Remote Code ..." [2]: https://businessabc.net/over-100-000-word-press-sites-affected-by-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-popular-plugin?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Over 100000 WordPress Sites Affected by Remote Code ..." [3]: https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2025/12/attackers-actively-exploiting-critical-vulnerability-in-king-addons-for-elementor-plugin/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Attackers Actively Exploiting Critical Vulnerability in King ..." [4]: https://securityonline.info/critical-elementor-plugin-flaw-cve-2025-8489-cvss-9-8-under-active-exploitation-allows-unauthenticated-admin-takeover/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Critical Elementor Plugin Flaw (CVE-2025-8489, CVSS 9.8 ..." [5]: https://thehackernews.com/2025/12/wordpress-king-addons-flaw-under-active.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com "WordPress King Addons Flaw Under Active Attack Lets ..."

loading..   04-Dec-2025
loading..   6 min read
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E-Com

Coupang

South Korea’s Coupang confirmed a data breach that exposed the names, email addr...

South Korean e-commerce giant **Coupang** has confirmed a massive data breach that exposed the personal information of about **33.7 million customer accounts**, in what officials are calling **South Korea’s worst data leak in more than a decade**. The incident, disclosed publicly on **December 1, 2025**, involves a **five-month intrusion window** that remained undetected until mid-November and has triggered criminal investigations, regulatory scrutiny, political backlash and a sharp hit to Coupang’s market value. ## Breach at a Glance: 5-Month Window, 33.7M Accounts, Overseas Servers Coupang first spotted something was wrong on **November 18**, when it detected unauthorised access affecting about **4,500 user accounts**. A deeper forensic review then revealed that the attacker had, in fact, accessed data tied to roughly **33.7 million customers in South Korea**. Key timeline details: * **Initial unauthorized access:** believed to have begun on **June 24, 2025** * **Infrastructure:** attack traffic routed via **overseas servers**, complicating attribution * **Discovery date:** **November 18, 2025**, after anomalous account activity * **Public disclosure:** weekend of **November 30 – December 1, 2025** The breach window of nearly **five months** is central to both regulatory and political criticism, with President **Lee Jae-myung** calling it “astonishing” that the company failed to recognise the breach for so long. ## What Was Exposed Coupang has confirmed that the attacker accessed a large corpus of customer identity and contact data: * **Full names** * **Email addresses** * **Mobile / phone numbers** * **Shipping and home addresses** * **Portions of order history** (items ordered, related metadata) Equally important is what Coupang says **was not** compromised: * Payment card numbers * Other payment information * Login credentials and account passwords The company maintains that **financial data and authentication passwords remain secure**. However, from a security risk perspective, this still represents a **high-value identity dataset**. Combined names, phone numbers, addresses and order patterns are extremely useful for: * Highly personalized **phishing campaigns** that reference real purchases * **Smishing** (SMS phishing) that impersonates delivery or refund workflows * Social engineering for **account takeover** on other platforms * Targeted **fraud and scam operations** using detailed personal profiles For context, the number of impacted accounts (≈33.7M) exceeds Coupang’s reported **24.7 million active users**, which means dormant or less active accounts were also caught in the exposure. ## How the Attack Worked While full technical details are still emerging, early statements by officials and Coupang executives outline a clear, high-risk pattern: * Investigators believe the attacker used a **stolen private encryption key** to authenticate into Coupang’s systems. * The prime suspect is reportedly a **former Chinese Coupang engineer** who allegedly retained or misused access post-employment. From a security architecture perspective, this suggests several breakdowns: 1. **Key Management & Protection** * A private encryption key used for authentication should be tightly controlled, rotated and stored in hardened key-management systems (HSMs or equivalent). * Successful abuse of such a key indicates either inadequate **key custody** or poor **rotation and revocation** practices after staff departures. 2. **Offboarding & Privileged Identity Management (PIM)** * The involvement of a former employee points to **gaps in access revocation** and privileged identity deprovisioning. * Mature organizations enforce **zero-standing privilege**, strict offboarding checklists and real-time revocation of all keys and tokens. 3. **Network & Data Segmentation** * The ability to pull data at the scale of tens of millions of accounts suggests insufficient **segmentation between customer PI data stores and broader infrastructure**, allowing wide data access once initial credentials were validated. 4. **Behavioral & Anomaly Detection** * A five-month detection lag indicates that **user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA)** and **access pattern anomaly detection** were either absent or ineffective. * Access from overseas servers over a long period, combined with large-volume data queries, should normally trigger alerts in a mature SOC. Put simply: this appears to be a classic **insider-enabled breach** amplified by **weak key and identity governance** and **late-stage detection**. ## Coupang’s Response: Containment, External Forensics and Public Apology Once the incident was detected, Coupang says it took several immediate actions: * **Blocked the unauthorized access route** used via overseas servers * **Strengthened internal monitoring** of access and data flows * **Retained an independent security firm** to support forensics and remediation * **Reported the incident** to key South Korean authorities, including: * Korea Internet & Security Agency (**KISA**) * Personal Information Protection Commission (**PIPC**) * National Police Agency CEO **Park Dae-jun** published a formal apology on Coupang’s website, expressing regret for the incident and pledging full cooperation with investigators and regulators. Despite the apology, the company is facing questions not just about how the breach occurred, but why a platform of its scale lacked the telemetry and controls to contain it sooner. ## Regulatory and Political Fallout: Toward Trillion-Won Penalties The breach has rapidly escalated into a **national policy issue**. * President **Lee Jae-myung** has ordered **swift action to penalize those responsible**, calling for a review of **higher fines and punitive damages** for corporate data-protection failures. * Current law allows penalties up to **3% of annual revenue**. For Coupang, that could mean potential fines exceeding **₩1 trillion** (about **USD 680 million**) in extreme scenarios. * The administration has framed personal data as a **“key asset in the age of AI and digitalization”**, arguing that corporate negligence in this area can no longer be tolerated as a cost of doing business. Regulators are examining whether Coupang violated South Korea’s **personal information protection rules**, particularly around: * Timely detection and disclosure of breaches * Adequate technical safeguards for large-scale PI datasets * Secure handling of encryption keys and access tokens * Offboarding and residual access controls for former employees The combination of **record scale**, **extended exposure window** and **insider indications** makes this case a prime candidate for setting **new precedent** on penalties and compliance expectations in South Korea’s tech sector. ## Market Impact: Stock Slide, Litigation Risk and Trust Deficit The market response has been swift: * Coupang’s **New York–listed stock** dropped around **5–9%** following disclosure, erasing part of the gains it had accumulated earlier in 2025. Beyond immediate price movement, the breach creates several medium-term risks: 1. **Class-Action Lawsuits** * Reports indicate **10,000+ customers** are considering or preparing to join class-action efforts, often seeking at least **₩100,000 per person** in damages. 2. **Higher Cybersecurity and Compliance Spend** * Coupang will likely be forced to increase investments in: significantly * Identity & access management (IAM, PIM, PAM) * Key management and HSM infrastructure * SOC modernization and UEBA tooling * This will pressure margins and may be closely scrutinized by investors during upcoming earnings cycles. 3. **Reputational Damage and Churn** * Trust is central in e-commerce. A breach of this magnitude can: * Increase account deletion and opt-out rates * Reduce order frequency from security-conscious customers * Strengthen competitors who position themselves as “more secure” alternatives ## Coupang’s History of Repeated Data Incidents TechCrunch notes this latest breach arrives on top of **a string of prior incidents** involving Coupang’s systems. Past issues include: * Data leaks between **2020 and 2021** affecting customers and delivery drivers * A **December 2023** incident in which its seller management system exposed the personal information of more than **22,000 customers** This pattern reinforces a key concern for regulators and customers: Coupang’s **security maturity and governance frameworks** have not scaled at the same pace as its **explosive e-commerce growth** in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. While Coupang says there is currently **no evidence that Coupang Taiwan or Rocket Now customer data** was affected by the current breach, the company’s multi-market footprint raises the stakes for **cross-border data governance and cloud security posture management**. Any large consumer platform operating in or adjacent to South Korea will be expected to **prove** that lessons from this breach have been internalised. ## Where This Leaves Coupang — and the Region Coupang is often called **“the Amazon of South Korea”**, and this incident demonstrates what happens when massive scale meets imperfect security governance. In the short term, the company faces: * Regulatory investigations * Possible record fines * Class-action lawsuits * A reputational repair challenge that will take sustained transparency and investment In the longer term, this breach is likely to become a **reference case** in Asian cybersecurity: * For lawmakers: a catalyst for **tougher personal-data regulation** * For enterprises: a benchmark for **what not to do** in key management and off-boarding * For users: a reminder that **non-financial personal data still carries real-world risk** If Coupang can demonstrate a credible end-to-end overhaul of its **identity, access and detection stack**, it may eventually turn this crisis into a security-maturity inflexion point. But for now, the incident stands as a stark warning: in modern e-commerce, scale without security is a systemic liability, not an advantage.

loading..   02-Dec-2025
loading..   8 min read
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ShadyPanda

7-year ShadyPanda campaign infected over 4.3 million browsers via malicious Chro...

**In one of the most sustained digital espionage campaigns ever uncovered, over 4.3 million Chrome and Edge users had their browsing activity, passwords, and online identities silently harvested for years by the very browser extensions they trusted.** Dubbed "ShadyPanda" by cybersecurity firm Koi Security, this seven-year campaign exploited a fundamental flaw in the global browser ecosystem, turning routine security updates into a weapon against unsuspecting users. The investigation reveals a patient, sophisticated operation in which attackers first published legitimate extensions, gained coveted "Featured" status in official stores, and then—years later—pushed malicious updates that transformed helpful tools into full-spectrum spyware. As of early December 2025, extensions linked to the campaign, including one with approximately 3 million installations, reportedly remain available on the Microsoft Edge Add-ons store despite public disclosure. ### Patient Digital Heist The ShadyPanda operation didn't hack browsers; it hijacked trust. Its methodology reveals a blueprint for modern digital infiltration: **Phase 1: The Legitimate Front (2018-2023)** Attackers published over 150 benign extensions—primarily wallpaper managers, screenshot tools, and productivity enhancers—to the Chrome Web Store and Microsoft Edge Add-ons store. These passed standard reviews, accumulated millions of users, and some even earned official "Featured" or "Verified" badges, the highest trust signals in browser marketplaces. **Phase 2: The Silent Weaponization (Mid-2024)** The critical turn came through routine, automated updates. Extensions like "Clean Master," with established user bases, received updates containing a sophisticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) framework. This allowed attackers to silently deploy any surveillance payload at will, turning browsers into live-feeds of user activity. **Phase 3: Live Surveillance & Data Harvesting (Ongoing)** At least five extensions on the Edge store, including the massively popular "WeTab" (3 million installs), continue to actively collect: * Complete browsing history and real-time activity * Authentication cookies (enabling account takeover) * Keystrokes and form data (including passwords) * Device fingerprints and location data * Screenshots of browser sessions ### Why It Worked "This campaign exposes the bankruptcy of the 'review-at-submission' model that both Google and Microsoft employ," explains Dr. Elena Vargas, a supply-chain security researcher at MIT. "We treat extensions like trusted applications, but their update mechanism operates like an unguarded backdoor." The central failure is procedural: both major browser stores conduct primary security reviews only when an extension is first submitted. Subsequent updates are largely automated and trusted, creating what security professionals call a "supply-chain attack vector." ShadyPanda simply waited out the initial review period—sometimes for five years—before deploying its malicious payloads. A comparative analysis reveals stark differences in platform response: | Platform | Number of Identified Malicious Extensions | Key Example | Current Status (Dec 2025) | Response Timeframe | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **Chrome Web Store** | 150+ extensions | "Clean Master" (RCE backdoor) | **Removed** post-disclosure | Days after disclosure | | **Microsoft Edge Add-ons** | 5+ active extensions | "WeTab" (3M+ installs) | **Reportedly still available** | No public removal/statement | ### Beyond Numbers While 4.3 million is a staggering figure, the true impact is qualitative. Affected users include: * **Business Professionals**: Whose corporate credentials and internal tool access may have been compromised * **Financial Services Users**: Whose banking sessions and personal finance data were exposed * **Journalists & Activists**: Whose browsing patterns and communications could identify sources or associates * **Healthcare Patients**: Researching sensitive medical conditions through compromised browsers "This isn't just stolen credit cards," notes Marcus Thrane, head of incident response at a global cybersecurity firm. "This is the gradual, comprehensive mapping of digital lives—relationships, interests, fears, and identities—sold to the highest bidder or leveraged for more targeted attacks." ### Commercial Spyware Pipeline Evidence suggests the stolen data feeds a growing commercial surveillance ecosystem. According to leaked threat actor communications analyzed by security firm Unit 221B, browser history datasets from Western users command premium prices in underground forums, often categorized by: * **Professional Value**: IT administrators, developers, and executives * **Interest-Based Targeting**: Political affiliations, health conditions, sexual orientation * **Financial Capacity**: Banking, investment, and luxury goods browsing The extensions themselves appear financially motivated through multiple streams: affiliate fraud (hijacking shopping commissions), direct data sales, and potentially targeted ad injection. ### Regulatory Blind Spot The ShadyPanda campaign operates in a regulatory gray zone. Unlike data breaches where personally identifiable information is stolen from a company's database, this constitutes a distributed, continuous collection directly from user devices. * **GDPR/CCPA Implications**: While these regulations grant users rights over their data, enforcement against anonymous threat actors operating through foreign infrastructure remains nearly impossible. * **Platform Liability**: Current interpretations of Section 230 in the U.S. generally protect platforms from liability for third-party content, potentially including malicious extensions. * **Consumer Protection Gaps**: No mechanism exists for notifying the millions of affected individuals, as there's no responsible entity to coordinate disclosure. ### Beyond Basic Security For organizations and advanced users: 1. **Enterprise Extension Management**: Enterprises should deploy centralized browser management that whitelists only pre-vetted extensions and blocks automatic updates for critical tools. 2. **Network-Level Monitoring**: Unusual traffic patterns from browsers to known malicious servers (identified in Koi's report) should trigger immediate incident response. 3. **Credential Rotation Strategy**: Assume authentication cookies are compromised; implement mandatory re-authentication for sensitive applications. 4. **Browser Segmentation**: Use separate browser profiles or virtual machines for different activities (work, personal, finance, healthcare). ShadyPanda represents more than a large-scale malware campaign; it signals the end of naive trust in the digital tools we use daily. The very mechanisms designed for our protection—automated updates, platform verification badges, centralised app stores—were systematically weaponised against us. The campaign's seven-year success reveals an uncomfortable truth: in today's digital ecosystem, legitimacy is not a permanent state but a temporary condition that invisible actors can revoke at any moment. As browsers become our primary interface to the world—handling everything from email to banking to healthcare—their extension ecosystems represent one of the largest, least-regulated software supply chains on Earth. Until platforms implement continuous behavioral analysis of extensions (monitoring what they *do* after approval, not just what they *claim* to do at submission), and until regulatory frameworks recognize distributed data collection as the systemic threat it represents, the ShadyPanda blueprint will inevitably be replicated. In the architecture of modern digital life, we've discovered that the most convenient doors are also the easiest to leave unlocked—and someone has been walking through them for seven years. The final irony may be this: the extensions promised to enhance our browsing experience. Instead, they turned our browsers into panopticons, proving that in the digital age, the most valuable commodity isn't technology, but the trust we place in it.

loading..   01-Dec-2025
loading..   6 min read