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Data Breach

Gambling

FanDuel

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FanDuel Data Breach: 133 Customers' Info Exposed, MailChimp Lapses

FanDuel data breach exposes 133 customers' personal information via MailChimp, raising questions on vendor responsibility & previous security lapses

23-Jan-2023
4 min read

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LinkedIn

Espionage

Lazarus hacking group's cyber espionage: Learn how LightlessCan infiltrated a Sp...

# Cybersecurity News Analysis: Lazarus Hacking Group Targets Spanish Aerospace Company In a recent cybersecurity incident, the notorious North Korean hacking group known as 'Lazarus' demonstrated their evolving tactics by targeting employees of a Spanish aerospace company. The attack involved a cunning blend of social engineering and the deployment of a previously undocumented backdoor named 'LightlessCan.' Let's dissect the technical details of this operation. ## Operation Dreamjob: A Deceptive Approach Lazarus initiated this attack with a deceptive LinkedIn message from a fake recruiter, masquerading as 'Steve Dawson' from Meta (Facebook). The target was lured into engaging with the attackers by feigning interest in a job opportunity. As the conversation progressed, the victim was asked to prove their proficiency in C++ programming, a clever ruse to introduce malicious payloads. ## Payload Delivery and Execution To deliver the malicious payloads, Lazarus employed ISO files containing executable quizzes. When executed, these files silently dropped an additional payload onto the victim's machine using DLL side-loading through 'mscoree.dll,' a legitimate program ('PresentationHost.exe'). This additional payload was the NickelLoader malware loader, responsible for deploying two backdoors, including 'LightlessCan.' ## miniBlindingCan: A Versatile Backdoor miniBlindingCan, a variant of BlindingCan with reduced functionality, was one of the backdoors deployed. This backdoor supports a range of commands, allowing the attacker to gather system information, update communication intervals with the command and control (C2) server, download and decrypt files, and execute shellcode. Its versatility makes it a potent tool for cyber espionage. ## LightlessCan: The Advanced Backdoor ESET's analysis revealed LightlessCan as the star of this attack. It's a successor to BlindingCan, boasting a more sophisticated code structure, different indexing, and enhanced functionality. In version 1.0, it supports a staggering 43 commands, with an additional 25 commands lurking in the code, yet to be implemented. What sets LightlessCan apart is its ability to mimic native Windows commands, such as 'ping' and 'ipconfig,' while remaining invisible to real-time monitoring tools. ## Evolving Defense Measures One intriguing defense measure implemented by Lazarus is the encryption of one LightlessCan payload with a key dependent on the target's environment. This tactic thwarts attempts by security researchers or analysts to access the victim's computer, emphasizing Lazarus' commitment to secrecy and espionage. ## Espionage Over Financial Gain This attack underscores that Lazarus' motives extend beyond mere financial gain, such as cryptocurrency theft. Their 'Operation Dreamjob' campaign reveals a strategic shift towards espionage, targeting sensitive information and intellectual property. ## Implications for Organizations For organizations in the crosshairs of threat groups like Lazarus, this development is concerning. The introduction of LightlessCan showcases the group's growing sophistication and adaptability. Enterprises must remain vigilant, continuously updating their cybersecurity defenses to counter evolving threats. ## Conclusion The Lazarus hacking group's recent attack on a Spanish aerospace company serves as a stark reminder of the ever-changing landscape of cybersecurity threats. Their blend of social engineering and the deployment of advanced backdoors like LightlessCan demonstrates the need for organizations to stay proactive and vigilant in defending against cyber adversaries. In this dynamic environment, understanding the nuances of such attacks is paramount to crafting effective defense strategies. As cybersecurity professionals, staying informed about the latest tactics and tools employed by threat actors is essential to safeguarding our digital assets and sensitive information. For the Spanish aerospace company, this incident serves as a wake-up call, highlighting the need for robust cybersecurity measures to protect against persistent and determined adversaries like Lazarus. The future of cybersecurity lies in continuous adaptation and proactive defense, and organizations must rise to the challenge to secure their digital infrastructure.

loading..   30-Sep-2023
loading..   3 min read
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Vulnerability

Discover and address the critical JetBrains TeamCity vulnerability (CVE-2023-427...

CVE-2023-42793, a critical vulnerability resulting in ripples, specifically targets TeamCity, JetBrains' popular CI/CD server. Its implications are significant, granting unauthenticated attackers the ability to execute arbitrary code on TeamCity servers, thereby facilitating remote code execution (RCE). Here, in this [Threatfeed](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news) we delve into the details of CVE-2023-42793, assess its consequences, and discuss the measures required to safeguard your systems. ## Key Information ### Sonar's Discovery The discovery of CVE-2023-42793 can be credited to Sonar's Vulnerability Research Team. They discovered a vulnerability that enables unauthenticated attackers to gain remote code execution privileges on TeamCity servers. This vulnerability poses an imminent threat, as it allows attackers to steal source code, access sensitive service secrets and private keys, manipulate the build process, and compromise the integrity of software releases. This vulnerability is not dependent on user interaction, making it an enticing target for malicious actors. Meanwhile, Greynoise is currently tracking many IP addresses from which CVE-2023-42793 exploit attempts are being made. ### Vulnerability Details The root cause of this vulnerability lies in an authentication bypass. Specifically, TeamCity versions 2023.05.3 and earlier of the on-premises variant are susceptible. Attackers can exploit this flaw without requiring a valid account on the target instance, rendering it easily exploitable. As a result, we are compelled to emphasize the urgency of prompt action to mitigate this risk. ## Impact ### The Gravity of RCE [CVE-2023-42793](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-42793) strikes at the heart of cybersecurity concerns. With RCE capabilities, attackers can not only pilfer source code but also gain access to highly confidential service secrets and private keys. Moreover, the ability to interfere with the build process by injecting malicious code jeopardizes the integrity of software releases. The most concerning aspect is that this vulnerability requires no user interaction, making it an attractive option for cybercriminals. ### Urgency of Action To underscore the urgency of the situation, it's crucial to note that this vulnerability does not necessitate a valid account on the targeted instance. Its trivial exploitability raises concerns about its potential exploitation in the wild. Shodan currently identifies over 3,000 on-premises TeamCity servers accessible from the Internet. ## Indicators of Compromise ### Unveiling Malicious Activity One crucial indicator of compromise is the existence of an authentication token named RPC2. This token's presence strongly suggests unauthorized and potentially malicious user activity on the server. It's essential to recognize that an attacker may attempt to cover their tracks by deleting or renaming this token post-exploitation. ## Technical Details ### Request Interceptors TeamCity employs request interceptors to execute specific actions for every HTTP request. A critical role of these interceptors is the authorization mechanism. These interceptors are part of the global request handling process and are often overlooked during security assessments. In the context of this vulnerability, a wildcard expression, "**/RPC2," was unintentionally included, disabling the authorization check for requests ending with "/RPC2." ### Request Path Parameters TeamCity offers a REST API for external application integration. While the documentation outlines endpoints, some hidden endpoints, like "/app/rest/users/<userLocator>/tokens/{name}," can be exploited. This specific endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to create a new authentication token with an arbitrary name, including "RPC2." ## Patch ### The Path to Security JetBrains swiftly addressed this vulnerability with the release of TeamCity version 2023.05.4. The patch removes the wildcard expression for the "/RPC2" pre-handling exception, ensuring that pre-handling is only disabled when "/RPC2" is accessed directly without additional prefixes in the requested path. This measure effectively prevents authentication bypass for other endpoints. ## Timeline ### Collaborative Efforts JetBrains and the Sonar Vulnerability Research Team maintained open communication throughout the discovery and remediation process. JetBrains' rapid response and efficient collaboration ensured a swift resolution to this critical security issue. - **September 6, 2023**: The vulnerability is reported to JetBrains. - **September 6, 2023**: JetBrains acknowledges receipt of the report. - **September 7, 2023**: JetBrains fixes the issue in the 2023.05 branch. - **September 12, 2023**: JetBrains prepares a plugin as a workaround. - **September 14, 2023**: JetBrains confirms the issue as a major security concern. - **September 18, 2023**: TeamCity version 2023.05.4 is released, addressing the vulnerability. - **September 18, 2023**: JetBrains notifies customers to update promptly. - **September 19, 2023**: CVE-2023-42793 is published. - **September 21, 2023**: Coordinated release of blog posts from JetBrains and Sonar. - **September 27, 2023**: Full disclosure follows the public release of an exploit. ## Learnings ### The Importance of Authorization This incident underscores the significance of authorization checks. While endpoints often receive individual checks, global request interceptors are frequently overlooked. These interceptors, part of the global attack surface, must not be neglected in security assessments. ### Taming Wildcards Wildcard expressions, while versatile, can inadvertently expose vulnerabilities. A more restrictive approach is advisable to prevent unintended vulnerabilities like the inclusion of "/**/RPC2."

loading..   30-Sep-2023
loading..   5 min read
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Info Stealer

Dependabot

Discover the intricate GitHub attack: Threat actors impersonating Dependabot, st...

In July 2023, Our scanners detected a series of atypical commits across hundreds of GitHub repositories, seemingly originating from Dependabot but concealing malevolent intentions. This [Threatfeed](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-works) delves deep into the technical intricacies of this cyberattack, highlighting the tactics employed by threat actors and the implications for developers and security professionals. ## **Deceptive Commits** Between July 8-11, threat actors embarked on a sophisticated campaign, compromising both public and private GitHub repositories, focusing predominantly on Indonesian user accounts. Their modus operandi involved crafting counterfeit commit messages meticulously designed to mimic genuine contributions from Dependabot. This ruse aimed to deceive developers into dismissing the malicious activity. The attackers ingeniously camouflaged their actions by impersonating the user account "dependabot[bot]." This manipulation added a layer of authenticity to their deceitful commits, making them appear benign at first glance. ## **Malicious Code Unveiled** In our extensive analysis of the affected repositories, we uncovered two distinct patterns of code changes suggestive of automated scripting. The first insidious alteration introduced a new GitHub Action file named "hook.yml." This file triggered every code push event, surreptitiously exfiltrating GitHub secrets and variables to a malicious endpoint: `hxxps://send[.]wagateway.pro/webhook`. The second malicious modification was equally cunning. The attackers targeted JavaScript files (`.js`) within the projects, appending obfuscated lines of code at the end. This code snippet created a new script tag, executed in web browsers, and fetched an additional script from `hxxps://send[.]wagateway.pro/client.js?cache=ignore`. Its purpose was clear: intercepting user-submitted passwords from web forms and funneling them to the same exfiltration endpoint. ## ** Attack Chain** Understanding the attack's progression is crucial to fortifying defenses against such incursions. The assault unfurled in three distinct phases: **Step 1 – Workspace Initialization:** Victims inadvertently played a pivotal role by initializing their development environments with personal access tokens (PATs) or alternative identification methods. These tokens, stored locally on their machines, became ripe targets for extraction. Notably, PATs do not mandate two-factor authentication (2FA), rendering them vulnerable to exploitation. **Step 2 – Stealing the Developer's Credentials:** How attackers acquired developers' credentials remains speculative, but a prevalent method suggests using malicious packages. These insidious packages covertly exfiltrated PATs to the attackers' command and control (C2) server, providing unhindered access to compromised accounts. **Step 3 – Poisoning the Victim's Code Projects:** Armed with stolen PATs, the attackers authenticated themselves on GitHub and executed the malevolent code changes detailed earlier. The scale of this assault suggested automation, highlighting the need for robust threat detection and prevention measures. ## **Implications and Lessons** This incident serves as a stark reminder of the evolving sophistication of supply chain attacks, particularly when attackers exploit trusted entities like Dependabot. Developers and organizations must exercise vigilance in code acquisition, even from reputable sources like GitHub. It underscores the need for enhanced security measures. To mitigate the risk of compromised tokens, GitHub introduces a groundbreaking solution: fine-grained personal access tokens (PATs) in public beta. These tokens afford developers granular control over permissions, reducing the potential for damage if a token is breached. However, it's important to note that access log activity for GitHub's personal access tokens is exclusively visible to enterprise accounts, leaving non-enterprise users in the dark about potential compromises. ## **Fine-Grained Personal Access Tokens: A Game Changer** GitHub recognizes the paramount importance of safeguarding credentials and introduces fine-grained PATs to bolster security. Here's how they differ from the traditional personal access tokens (classic): - **Granular Permissions:** Fine-grained PATs offer over 50 granular permissions that control access to GitHub's APIs, granting read or read-and-write access on a per-permission basis. For instance, a PAT can be configured to read issues within a repository exclusively. - **Repository Targeting:** Unlike classic PATs, fine-grained tokens do not possess universal access. They are tailored to specific repositories or organizations, minimizing the scope of potential breaches. - **Expiration:** Fine-grained PATs come with expiration dates, ensuring that access is time-limited and reducing long-term risk. ## **Creating Fine-Grained Personal Access Tokens** Developers can create fine-grained PATs through the Developer Settings section in their account settings. This feature simplifies building integrations and testing scripts, offering a level of control and security previously unavailable. ## **Approving and Auditing Tokens** Organization owners gain newfound control over fine-grained PATs. They can opt to approve or reject each token targeting their organization or repositories. This feature enhances visibility and accountability, empowering organizations to safeguard their resources effectively. ## **Choosing the Right Access Method** While fine-grained PATs represent a significant leap in access control, there are scenarios where classic PATs remain necessary, such as access beyond one's organization or integration with enterprise account APIs. GitHub Actions and GitHub Apps are recommended for long-term automation needs, combining highly targeted permissions with administrator controls. ## **What's on the Horizon** GitHub's commitment to security extends beyond this release. Future enhancements include support for GraphQL with fine-grained PATs, expanded API support for fine-grained permissions, and additional features for administrators to set and enforce PAT policies at scale. ## **Get Started with Fine-Grained PATs** Fine-grained personal access tokens are now available to all GitHub users, organizations, and enterprises on GitHub.com. Users are encouraged to provide feedback as GitHub continually refines this groundbreaking security feature.

loading..   28-Sep-2023
loading..   5 min read