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EMOTET

Botnet

Malware

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EMOTET auto uninstalled from all infected devices, Law Enforcement updated

As the date reached, the updated bot with a cleanup module deployed back then has started to trigger

27-Apr-2021
7 min read

No content available.

Related Articles

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React2Shell

Critical React flaw CVE-2025-55182 is actively exploited. Over 30 organizations ...

The global technology community is facing a severe and urgent security crisis. A maximum-severity vulnerability in React, one of the world's most popular web development libraries, is being actively exploited by nation-state hackers and criminal groups, compromising thousands of servers within days of its disclosure. Designated CVE-2025-55182 and dubbed "React2Shell," the flaw has drawn direct comparisons to the 2021 Log4Shell event for its ease of exploitation and widespread impact. This technical deep-dive explores the intricate mechanics of the vulnerability, the sophisticated multi-stage attacks already unfolding, and the critical steps every organization must take immediately. ### A Deserialization Betrayal At its heart, React2Shell is a fundamental flaw in the "Flight" protocol, the system React uses to communicate between server and client components. It stems from **insecure deserialization**—the unsafe process of converting serialized data from an HTTP request back into executable objects on the server. **How the Exploit Works:** Attackers craft a malicious HTTP POST request containing a specially formatted payload. This payload abuses self-referencing JSON structures to trick the server's deserialization logic. By manipulating object properties, attackers can hijack the JavaScript event loop, attaching malicious code to a special `.then` property. When the server automatically attempts to process this, it executes the attacker's commands, resulting in unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) with a CVSS score of 10.0. ### From Disclosure to Exploitation: The timeline underscores the extreme urgency: * **November 29:** Researcher Lachlan Davidson responsibly discloses the flaw to Meta. * **December 3:** Public disclosure and patch release occur simultaneously. * **Within Hours:** Amazon Web Services (AWS) threat intelligence observes exploitation attempts from infrastructure linked to Chinese state-nexus threat groups **Earth Lamia** and **Jackpot Panda**. * **December 4-5:** Fully weaponized public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits are released, leading to a surge in global scanning and compromise. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. ### Beyond Simple Cryptomining Real-world exploitation has moved rapidly from reconnaissance to sophisticated post-compromise activities. Security firm Wiz has observed attackers using initial access to launch multi-stage campaigns: | Attack Phase | Common Activities & Goals | | :--- | :--- | | **Initial Reconnaissance** | Running commands like `whoami`, `hostname`, and dumping environment variables to understand the compromised system. | | **Credential & Secret Harvesting** | Systematically scouring filesystems for `.env` files, cloud credentials (AWS, Azure), SSH keys, and npm configurations. A primary goal is accessing cloud metadata services to steal IAM roles. | | **Payload Deployment** | Installing **cryptominers** (like XMRig), deploying remote access trojans (RATs) such as **VShell**, or installing full-featured backdoor frameworks like **Sliver** for persistent control. | | **Lateral Movement** | Using the compromised web server as a beachhead to scan and move into internal corporate networks. | ### A Broader Ecosystem at Risk While the popular Next.js framework has been a primary target due to its default vulnerable configuration, the vulnerability's root lies in core React packages. This means the threat extends across the modern web development ecosystem. **Affected and Patched Versions:** | Component | Vulnerable Versions | Patched Versions | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **React Packages** (`react-server-dom-webpack`, `-parcel`, `-turbopack`) | 19.0, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, 19.2.0 | 19.0.1, 19.1.2, 19.2.1 | | **Next.js** (Using App Router) | 15.x (prior to 15.5.7), 16.x (prior to 16.0.7) | 15.5.7, 16.0.7, or later | | **Other Frameworks** | Waku, Vite (with RSC plugin), Parcel, RedwoodJS are also confirmed vulnerable. | Consult framework-specific advisories. | ### Detection, Response, and the Critical Patch Mandate Given the active exploits, organizations must operate under an "assume breach" mindset for any unpatched, internet-facing React/Next.js application. **1. Immediate Patching is Non-Negotiable:** Updating to the patched versions is the only complete remedy. For Next.js applications, note that updating the React package alone is insufficient; you must update the Next.js framework itself. **2. Hunt for Compromise:** Review server logs for Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), such as: * HTTP POST requests with `next-action` or `rsc-action-id` headers. * Request bodies containing unusual patterns like `"$1:a:a"` or `"status":"resolved_model"`. * Suspicious child processes spawned from Node.js applications or unexpected file writes to `/tmp/`. **3. Implement Interim Protections (Not a Substitute for Patching):** * **Web Application Firewalls (WAF):** Deploy emergency rules. AWS WAF's `AWSManagedRulesKnownBadInputsRuleSet` (v1.24+) includes detection. Similar rules are available from Google Cloud Armor and Cloudflare. * **Network Segmentation:** Restrict outbound traffic from web servers to break reverse-shell connections and contain potential lateral movement. As attackers continue to refine their exploits, the window for defensive action—measured in hours, not days—has nearly closed. For countless organizations worldwide, the immediate and complete remediation of this vulnerability is the most critical IT task at hand.

loading..   08-Dec-2025
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Ransomware

Pharma Research Firm Inotiv Confirms Massive Data Breach Following Qilin Ransomw...

**WEST LAFAYETTE, Ind. & BOSTON, Mass.** — Inotiv Inc. (NOTV), a pivotal contract research organization in the pharmaceutical development pipeline, has formally confirmed a significant data breach impacting nearly 10,000 individuals. The breach stems from a ransomware attack executed by the Qilin cybercrime group in early August 2025, culminating in the theft of highly sensitive personal, financial, and health information. The disclosure, made through mandatory regulatory filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a detailed notice to the Maine Attorney General, provides a stark case study in the modern cyber threat landscape. It illustrates a targeted assault on a scientific enterprise where the compromise of data carries profound ethical, legal, and operational consequences beyond immediate financial ransom. #### **Timeline of a Targeted Intrusion** The incident unfolded through a precise sequence of intrusion, discovery, and investigation, characteristic of a professionally executed ransomware operation. | **Date** | **Event Phase** | **Key Action & Details** | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **Aug 5-8, 2025** | **Initial Compromise & Encryption** | Qilin operatives gained access, deployed ransomware, and exfiltrated data. | | **Aug 8, 2025** | **Discovery & Containment** | Inotiv’s internal security team identified the attack, contained affected systems, and initiated forensic procedures. | | **Aug 18, 2025** | **Regulatory Disclosure** | Inotiv filed an 8-K form with the SEC, publicly acknowledging a cybersecurity incident that disrupted operations. | | **Oct 21, 2025** | **Data Analysis Completed** | Forensic investigators concluded data review, confirming the scope and sensitivity of stolen information. | | **Dec 2-3, 2025** | **Individual Notification** | Inotiv began notifying 9,542 affected individuals and submitted official breach details to the Maine AG. | #### **The Core of the Breach: A Treasure Trove of Sensitive Data** Moving beyond operational disruption, the forensic investigation revealed the attack's true severity: the successful exfiltration of approximately 162,000 files totaling 176 GB. The stolen data constitutes a comprehensive dossier on affected individuals, including: * **Personally Identifiable Information (PII):** Full names, addresses, and crucially, Social Security Numbers (SSNs) and government-issued identification numbers. * **Financial Data:** Credit and debit card numbers. * **Protected Health Information (PHI):** Medical records, health insurance details, and associated medical data. The population impacted includes current and former employees, their family members, and other associated individuals, indicating that the attackers exfiltrated data from broad-based human resources and administrative systems. #### **Corporate and Legal Response** In response, Inotiv has engaged a multi-pronged strategy focusing on remediation, legal compliance, and victim support: 1. **Technical Remediation:** The company contained the incident, restored systems from secure backups, and implemented "additional enhanced security measures." Law enforcement, including the FBI, was notified. 2. **Regulatory Compliance:** The company fulfilled its obligation under the SEC's new cybersecurity disclosure rules and state laws, formally reporting to the Maine Attorney General—a common requirement when breaches affect over 1,000 residents of a state. 3. **Victim Mitigation:** Inotiv is offering affected individuals **24 months of complimentary credit monitoring and identity restoration services** through Kroll, a standard but critical remediation step. The offer notably exceeds the 12-month period seen in many other breaches, such as the contemporaneous incident at Jack's Family Restaurants. #### **Nuanced Implications: Why This Breach Resonates** The Inotiv breach is not an isolated IT failure but a symptom of systemic vulnerabilities within high-stakes industries: * **Strategic Targeting of Life Sciences:** Attackers increasingly focus on pharmaceutical and research organizations due to their valuable intellectual property, sensitive human trial data, and pressing operational timelines, which may increase pressure to pay ransoms. * **The "Double Extortion" Playbook:** Qilin's method—encrypting systems *and* stealing data—represents the now-standard double-extortion model. The threat of leaking sensitive health data adds a powerful layer of coercion against a HIPAA-regulated entity. * **The Expanding Surface of Third-Party Risk:** As a Contract Research Organization (CRO), Inotiv is a vital third-party partner to numerous pharmaceutical companies. This breach exposes the cascading risk within the industry's ecosystem, where a compromise at one service provider can threaten the security posture of multiple major firms. The incident has already triggered investigations by plaintiff's law firms for potential class-action litigation, citing possible failures to implement adequate cybersecurity measures. This legal aftermath, combined with regulatory scrutiny, will define the long-term cost of the breach far beyond the initial ransom demand. *For individuals notified by Inotiv, cybersecurity experts strongly recommend enrolling in the offered credit monitoring, placing fraud alerts with national credit bureaus, and remaining vigilant against sophisticated phishing attempts that may leverage the stolen personal data.*

loading..   05-Dec-2025
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Mixpanel

A hidden Mixpanel breach exposes sensitive user analytics and raises serious que...

Mixpanel, one of the most widely embedded product analytics platforms in the SaaS ecosystem, confirmed a security incident that has rapidly escalated into a broader industry concern. What initially appeared to be a limited intrusion has evolved into a significant exposure event, revealing how deeply analytics services are embedded in modern architectures — and how vulnerable the ecosystem becomes when a telemetry provider is compromised. An unauthorized actor gained access to part of Mixpanel’s environment and exported a dataset containing identifiable analytics information. While the company stated that no passwords or payment data were exposed, the leaked set included names, emails, IP-derived geolocation, device metadata, and behavioral telemetry. In theory, this is “low-sensitivity.” In practice, it is the raw material for targeted phishing, identity profiling, and social-engineering attacks — a pattern well documented by organizations such as **[CISA](https://www.cisa.gov)** and **[ENISA](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirt-cert-services)**. ## **A Breach Rooted in Human Error — and Predictable Attack Patterns** The attack was triggered by a smishing message that deceived an internal user. Smishing has become a primary initial-access vector, with global trends highlighted by the **[Verizon’s Data Breach Investigations Report](https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/dbir/)**, which shows social engineering as the leading attack category for enterprise compromise. Once the attacker obtained session access, they used Mixpanel’s analytics export functionality to pull a curated dataset. This was not a chaotic grab; the extraction showed precision, aligning with the attacker behavior patterns described in **[Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence reports](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/microsoft-threat-intelligence)** — attackers increasingly prefer targeted reconnaissance over noisy exfiltration. Mixpanel revoked access, rotated credentials, and engaged incident-response specialists, following industry incident-handling practices such as those outlined in **[NIST’s Computer Security Incident Handling Guide](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-61/rev-2/final)**. But delays in customer notification highlight a persistent problem across the SaaS supply chain: the absence of real-time transparency when a vendor is breached. ## **Why “Low-Sensitivity” Telemetry is a Myth** Telemetry pipelines now collect a blend of identifiers, metadata, and event-level behavior. Individually, none of these fields seem dangerous. Together, they form high-resolution attack intelligence. * **Email address + device type** enables tailored phishing templates. * **Location + browsing environment** helps adversaries mimic trusted service alerts. * **Behavioral event logs** provide timing patterns for credential-harvesting attacks. Threat groups have repeatedly used such contextual profiling in major campaigns documented by **[Mandiant](https://www.mandiant.com/resources)** and **[CrowdStrike](https://www.crowdstrike.com/threat-intelligence/)**. The broader security community has long warned that metadata — not just passwords or financial data — fuels sophisticated intrusion workflows. The Mixpanel breach validates that position. ## **OpenAI’s Containment Strategy Shows How Critical This Exposure Is** OpenAI, one of Mixpanel’s high-visibility customers, immediately severed all telemetry integrations once notified. Although the leaked data concerned mainly API-level analytics rather than ChatGPT logs or credentials, OpenAI treated the situation as a material security incident. This aligns with best practices emphasized by **[NIST’s Zero Trust Architecture](https://www.nist.gov/publications/zero-trust-architecture)**: assume breach, compartmentalize, and remove unnecessary trust paths. Telemetry providers are deeply embedded in core workflows — and once compromised, they become a propagation vector for further attacks. ## **A Supply Chain Built on Implicit Trust** The Mixpanel exposure points to wider systemic issues. ### **1. Overprivileged Telemetry Pipelines** Many organizations give analytics vendors unrestricted event access. Research by **[OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)** repeatedly highlights excessive data collection as a critical weakness. ### **2. Export Functions With Weak Guardrails** Bulk data export should require multi-party approval or privileged workflows, a principle supported by frameworks like **[ISO 27001](https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html)**. Yet many SaaS analytics dashboards allow single-click extraction of large datasets. ### **3. Insufficient Monitoring of Vendor Activity** Organizations often fail to track what vendors are accessing or exporting — a risk repeatedly stressed in **[Gartner’s Third-Party Risk Insights](https://www.gartner.com/en)**. ### **4. Vulnerable Notification Windows** Delays in vendor breach disclosure cut into the critical window where organizations can reset credentials or warn users. This is a recurring issue seen across recent supply-chain attacks documented by **[SANS ICS reports](https://www.sans.org/ics/)**. ## **What Organizations Must Do Immediately** To prevent analytics-driven supply-chain breaches, enterprises must adopt stricter governance: ### **Audit Telemetry Streams** Follow data-minimization principles aligned with **[GDPR Article 5](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-5-gdpr/)** and remove unnecessary identifiers such as emails or full IPs. ### **Require Phishing-Resistant MFA** Adopt hardware-key or certificate-based authentication as recommended by **[FIDO Alliance](https://fidoalliance.org/)** for any admin-facing analytics system. ### **Restrict Export Capabilities** Bulk exports should: * require elevated roles, * be logged immutably, * support anomaly alerts, * and use approval workflows similar to **[SOC 2 controls](https://www.aicpa-cima.com/resources/article/aicpasocsuite)**. ### **Continuously Monitor Vendor Behavior** Organizations should require vendors to provide access logs, export logs, and anomaly alerts, aligning with best practices outlined by **[CSA’s Cloud Controls Matrix](https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/cloud-controls-matrix)**. ### **Rebuild Vendor Contracts** Contracts should enforce: * strict least-privilege data handling, * data residency guarantees, * breach notification SLAs, * and external security audits guided by **[NIST 800-53](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53/rev-5/final)**. Analytics platforms were once considered harmless reporting tools. Today, they function as shadow identity providers, session observers, and behavioral data aggregators — precisely the kind of systems adversaries want to compromise. Unless companies adopt rigorous telemetry governance, breaches like this will become routine.

loading..   04-Dec-2025
loading..   5 min read