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AWS

Log4Shell

Hotfix

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AWS addresses 4 container escape flaws of Log4Shell via its hot patch

Amazon Web Services addresses four high severity vulnerabilities in Log4Shell hotfix...

20-Apr-2022
4 min read

Related Articles

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GitLab

Access Token

An analysis of the Internet Archive's data breach via exposed GitLab tokens, com...

The Internet Archive, a cornerstone of digital preservation, has experienced another significant data breach. This time, the breach occurred through their Zendesk email support platform after threat actors exploited exposed GitLab authentication tokens. Despite prior warnings, the organization failed to rotate these tokens adequately, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive data. ### Background of the Internet Archive Breach Beginning last night, numerous individuals reported receiving unexpected emails in response to old support tickets submitted to the Internet Archive. These emails, originating from the organization's official Zendesk server, alerted users to the breach: >>> _"It's dispiriting to see that even after being made aware of the breach weeks ago, IA has still not done the due diligence of rotating many of the API keys that were exposed in their gitlab secrets. As demonstrated by this message, this includes a Zendesk token with perms to access 800K+ support tickets sent to info@archive.org since 2018."_ The threat actor emphasized the magnitude of the breach, highlighting access to over 800,000 support tickets submitted since 2018. The authenticity of these emails was verified through email headers that passed all DKIM, DMARC, and SPF authentication checks, confirming they were sent from an authorized Zendesk server. ### Exposure of Personal Identifiable Information (PII) Compounding the severity of the breach, some users had previously uploaded personal identification documents when requesting the removal of content from the Wayback Machine. Depending on the level of access the threat actor had within Zendesk, these sensitive attachments might now be compromised. The Zendesk Attachments API allows users to upload files to support tickets, which are then accessible through links in the agent interface and notification emails. Attachments are represented as JSON objects containing details like file_name, content_type, and content_url. If the threat actor exploited this API, they could have downloaded personal documents submitted by users. ### Timeline and Failure to Act BleepingComputer attempted repetatively to warn the Internet Archive about the exposed GitLab authentication tokens. On October 9th, they reported that the Internet Archive suffered two simultaneous attacks: - 1. A data breach compromising user data for 33 million users. - 2. A DDoS attack orchestrated by a pro-Palestinian group named SN_BlackMeta. While these attacks occurred concurrently, they were perpetrated by different threat actors. Misreporting led many to incorrectly attribute the data breach to SN_BlackMeta, frustrating the actual hacker who then reached out to Secure Blink to claim responsibility and provide details. ### Mechanism of the Breach The initial point of compromise was an exposed GitLab configuration file on one of the Internet Archive's development servers (services-hls.dev.archive.org). This file contained an authentication token that had been exposed since at least December 2022. The threat actor used this token to download the Internet Archive's source code. Within the source code, additional credentials and authentication tokens were discovered, including those for the organization's database management system. This access allowed the hacker to: ### Download the user database. #### Access further source code. **Modify the website.** The threat actor claims to have exfiltrated 7TB of data, though no samples were provided for verification. The inclusion of API access tokens for the Internet Archive's Zendesk support system in the stolen data further exacerbated the situation. **Negligence in Security Practices** Despite multiple warnings from Secure Blink, the Internet Archive failed to rotate the compromised authentication tokens promptly. The threat actor highlighted this negligence in their communication: >> _"Whether you were trying to ask a general question, or requesting the removal of your site from the Wayback Machine, your data is now in the hands of some random guy. If not me, it'd be someone else."_ This statement attempts to underscores the critical importance of proactive security measures and timely responses to potential threats. ### Understanding the Zendesk Attachments API Vulnerability The Zendesk Attachments API is designed to facilitate the uploading and attaching of files to support ticket comments. Key functionalities include: - **Uploading Files:** Users can upload files and attach them to ticket comments. - **Attachment Accessibility:** Attachments appear as links in the agent interface and notification emails. - **Attachment Properties:** Attachments are represented as JSON objects with properties such as content_type, content_url, file_name, size, etc. Given the potential sensitivity of the uploaded files (e.g., personal IDs), unauthorized access to these attachments poses a significant privacy risk. The API documentation specifies that while files are visible to any authenticated user until the upload token is consumed, once associated with a ticket, visibility is restricted. However, in this breach, the threat actor's access to the Zendesk platform could bypass these restrictions. ### Implications for Users and Organizations The breach has several profound implications: - **User Data Exposure:** Personal data, including identification documents, may have been compromised. - **Trust Erosion:** Users may lose confidence in the Internet Archive's ability to safeguard their information. - **Regulatory Scrutiny:** Potential violations of data protection regulations could lead to legal repercussions. ### Recommendations and Preventative Measures #### For Users: - **Monitor Accounts:** Keep an eye on personal accounts for any suspicious activity. - **Change Passwords:** Update passwords for accounts associated with the Internet Archive. - **Identity Protection:** Consider credit monitoring services if personal IDs were uploaded. #### For the Internet Archive and Similar Organizations: - **Rotate Credentials Regularly:** Implement policies for regular rotation of authentication tokens and API keys. - **Audit and Monitor:** Conduct frequent security audits to identify and remediate vulnerabilities. - **Implement Least Privilege Access:** Limit access permissions to only what is necessary for each role. - **Enhance Incident Response:** Develop robust incident response plans to address breaches swiftly. The Internet Archive's data breach is not just a stark reminder of the vulnerabilities that can arise from lapses in security protocols. In an era where data is a critical commodity, both organizations and users must remain super weary. Proactive security measures, timely response to threats, and user education are critical components in safeguarding against such breaches.

loading..   21-Oct-2024
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ESET

Data Wiper

Hackers breached ESET Israel's partner, Comsecure, using legitimate servers to s...

Hackers have breached Comsecure, ESET's exclusive partner in Israel, to conduct a sophisticated phishing campaign targeting Israeli businesses. The attackers utilized legitimate ESET infrastructure to distribute data wiper malware disguised as antivirus software, aiming for destructive attacks on Israeli organizations. ### What Happened? #### Compromise of ESET Israel's Partner On October 8th, a phishing campaign was launched where emails branded with ESET's logo were sent from the legitimate domain eset.co.il. This indicates that the email servers of ESET's Israeli distributor, Comsecure, were compromised. #### Phishing Emails Sent from Legitimate Servers The phishing emails appeared authentic as they passed SPF, DKIM, and DMARC authentication checks. This means that the emails originated from verified ESET servers, making them highly convincing to recipients and difficult for security systems to detect. ### Phishing Campaign Details #### Disguised as ESET's Advanced Threat Defense Team The emails pretended to be from _"ESET's Advanced Threat Defense Team,"_ warning recipients about state-backed attackers targeting their devices. The message leveraged fear of sophisticated threats to prompt immediate action. ### Introduction of "ESET Unleashed" To counter the alleged threat, the email offered a download link to _"ESET Unleashed,"_ purportedly a more advanced antivirus tool. The download link was hosted on the legitimate eset.co.il domain, adding further credibility. #### Malicious Payload Contents of the Downloaded ZIP File The ZIP archive contained: Four legitimate ESET DLL files digitally signed by ESET's code-signing certificate. An unsigned Setup.exe file, which was the malicious data wiper. ### Advanced Evasion Techniques The data wiper employed several evasion tactics: **Anti-Virtualization:** The malware detected virtual environments, making it difficult for researchers to analyze it in virtual machines. **Mutex Usage:** It used a Mutex associated with the [Yanluowang ransomware](https://www.secureblink.com/threat-research/yanluowang-ransomware-linked-to-thieflock-operators) group, potentially to confuse attribution efforts. ### Connection to Legitimate Israeli Websites Upon execution, the malware reached out to www.oref.org.il, a legitimate Israeli news site. This could be a tactic to blend in with normal traffic or verify internet connectivity. ### Impact on Israeli Organizations #### Targeting Cybersecurity Professionals Initial reports indicate that the phishing emails were sent to cybersecurity personnel within Israeli organizations. Compromising these individuals could allow attackers deeper access into secure systems. #### Irreversible Data Destruction The malware is a data wiper designed to irreversibly delete files and corrupt partition tables, making data recovery extremely difficult, if not impossible. #### Lack of Immediate Disclosure Despite the severity of the breach, there was a notable delay in public disclosure from ESET and Comsecure. This lack of transparency may have hindered affected organizations from taking prompt defensive actions. ### Attribution and Political Motivations Embedded Threats and Dates Analysis by cybersecurity experts revealed embedded messages within the malware: > _"Hey ESET, wait for the leak... Doing business with the occupiers puts you in scope!"_ An embedded date was also found, possibly correlating with significant events or other attacks. ### Links to Iranian Threat Actors There are indications that the attack may be linked to Iranian groups such as Handala and CyberToufan, known for: - Using data wipers in attacks against Israel. - Embedding political messages in their malware. - Aiming to sow chaos and disrupt Israel's economy rather than financial gain. ### Technical Details #### File Hashes of Malicious Files **ZIP Archive:** `2d55c68aa7781db7f2324427508947f057a6baca78073fee9a5ad254147c8232` **Setup.exe:** `2abff990d33d99a0732ddbb3a39831c2c292f36955381d45cd8d40a816d9b47a` ### YARA Rule for Detection A YARA rule has been shared by Kevin Beaumont to aid in detecting the malware: `rule ESETIsraelWiper` { `strings:` `$a = "Hey ESET, wait for the leak.. Doing` `business with the occupiers puts you in scope!"` `condition:` `$a` `}` ### ESET's Response ESET has added an antivirus signature Win32/Agent.AGFH to detect related malicious activity. ### Recommendations for Organizations #### Immediate Actions - Update Antivirus Definitions: Ensure that all antivirus software is updated to detect the latest threats. - Educate Staff: Inform employees about the phishing campaign, emphasizing caution with unexpected emails, even from legitimate sources. - Monitor Network Traffic: Watch for unusual outbound connections, especially to known legitimate websites from unexpected applications. ### Long-Term Strategies - Strengthen Email Security: Implement advanced email security solutions that can detect anomalies beyond standard SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks. - Regular Security Audits: Conduct frequent audits of partner and supplier security measures to prevent supply chain attacks. - Incident Response Planning: Develop and regularly update incident response plans to handle breaches promptly and effectively. Conclusion The breach of ESET's Israeli partner, Comsecure, underscores the evolving tactics of threat actors exploiting trusted infrastructure and employing sophisticated evasion techniques; attackers can deliver destructive payloads with devastating effects. Organizations must remain vigilant, prioritize transparency, and foster collaboration within the cybersecurity community to combat such threats. --- ### FAQs #### What is a data wiper? - A data wiper is malware designed to irreversibly delete files on a computer and often corrupts the partition table, making data recovery extremely difficult. #### How did the phishing emails bypass security systems? - The emails were sent from legitimate ESET servers and passed SPF, DKIM, and DMARC authentication checks, making them appear authentic to both recipients and email security systems. #### Who is believed to be behind the attack? - While not definitively attributed, evidence suggests possible involvement of Iranian-linked threat actors like Handala and CyberToufan, known for politically motivated attacks against Israel. #### What should I do if I receive such an email? - Do not download or execute any files from the email. Contact your IT security team immediately and report the incident. ### Has ESET released an official statement? - Yes, ESET has acknowledged the incident and released antivirus signatures to detect the malware. However, there was a delay in public disclosure, which has raised concerns.

loading..   19-Oct-2024
loading..   5 min read
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Linux

FASTCash

North Korean hackers deploy a new Linux FASTCash malware variant enabling unauth...

A newly identified [Linux](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/new-regre-ss-hion-critical-open-ssh-vulnerability-allows-root-access-on-linux) variant of the notorious FASTCash malware has been discovered, expanding the attack surface of North Korean hackers targeting financial institutions. Previously known to compromise IBM AIX and Microsoft Windows systems, this malware now poses a threat to Linux-based payment switch servers, enabling unauthorized cash withdrawals from ATMs. This development underscores the evolving tactics of threat actors like Hidden Cobra (also known as APT38 or [Lazarus Group](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/lazarus-targets-spanish-aerospace-with-lightless-can)) and highlights the urgent need for robust security measures in the financial sector. ### Background #### Evolution of FASTCash Malware The term FASTCash refers to a malware family [attributed](https://doubleagent.net/fastcash-for-linux/) to North Korean hackers, designed to infiltrate payment switch systems within compromised networks. Since at least 2016, FASTCash has facilitated unauthorized ATM cash-outs by manipulating transaction messages, resulting in the theft of tens of millions of dollars per incident across multiple countries. **2018:** The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [first warned](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2018/10/02/hidden-cobra-fastcash-campaign) about FASTCash, linking it to Hidden Cobra. **2019:** The first Windows variant surfaced, expanding the malware's reach beyond IBM AIX systems. **2020:** CISA updated its advisory to include the Windows variant, noting significant developments in the malware's capabilities. **2021:** Indictments were announced for three North Koreans involved in these schemes, responsible for over $1.3 billion in theft. ### Technical Analysis of the Linux Variant #### Compilation & Deployment The newly discovered Linux variant was compiled for Ubuntu Linux 20.04 using GCC 11.3.0. Analysis suggests that the malware was developed after April 21, 2022, likely within a [VMware](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/patch-critical-v-mware-v-center-vulnerabilities-to-prevent-rce-now) virtual machine environment. The use of Ubuntu indicates a shift, as traditional payment switch systems often run on proprietary UNIX systems or Windows. #### Similarities to Previous Variants The Linux variant shares operational similarities with its Windows and AIX predecessors: Currency Manipulation: Both the Linux and Windows variants operate in Turkish Lira (TRY), while the AIX variant used Indian Rupee (INR). ISO8583 Message Manipulation: The malware intercepts and manipulates ISO8583 messages, the standard for financial transaction card-originated messages. Approval of Declined Transactions: It authorizes previously declined transactions by injecting fraudulent response messages before they reach the acquirer. ### Intercepting Transaction Messages #### Payment Switch Systems Payment switches act as intermediaries, routing transaction messages between ATMs/POS terminals and financial institutions. By compromising these systems, the malware can manipulate transaction data undetected. #### ISO8583 Protocol Exploitation The malware hooks into the recv function of network processes to intercept ISO8583 messages, specifically targeting: Message Type Indicators (MTIs): Focuses on authorization requests (1xx) and financial transactions (2xx). Data Elements (DEs): Manipulates fields such as DE2 (Primary Account Number), DE3 (Processing Code), DE4 (Transaction Amount), DE49 (Transaction Currency Code), and DE54 (Additional Amounts). ![diagram.jpg](https://sb-cms.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/diagram_5d10d93578.jpg) ***FASTCash Operational Flow (Source:doubleagent.net)*** ### Process Injection Techniques Using the ptrace system call, the malware injects itself into running processes on the payment switch server. It employs shared libraries (libMyFc.so) to hook network functions, allowing it to monitor and alter transaction messages in real-time. ### Fraudulent Transaction Approval Upon intercepting a declined transaction due to insufficient funds (Processing Code 51), the malware: 1. Generates a Random Amount: Between 12,000 and 30,000 TRY (~$350 to $875). 2. Modifies Response Codes: Sets DE38 (Approval Code) and DE39 (Action Code) to indicate approval. 3. Adjusts Data Elements: Removes specific DEs related to security and authentication to avoid detection. 4. Sends Manipulated Response: Forwards the fraudulent approval to the bank's central systems, enabling unauthorized cash withdrawals. ### Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) The following SHA-256 hashes are associated with the Linux variant: f34b532117b3431387f11e3d92dc9ff417ec5dcee38a0175d39e323e5fdb1d2c 7f3d046b2c5d8c008164408a24cac7e820467ff0dd9764e1d6ac4e70623a1071 (UPX packed) ### Impact and Implications #### Expanded Attack Surface The discovery of a Linux variant indicates that North Korean hackers are broadening their targets to include a wider range of operating systems. This expansion poses significant risks to financial institutions that may rely on Linux-based systems for payment processing. #### Financial and Reputational Damage Unauthorized cash withdrawals facilitated by FASTCash can lead to substantial financial losses and damage the reputation of affected institutions. The malware's ability to evade detection exacerbates these risks. #### Challenges in Detection As of its discovery, the Linux variant had zero detections on VirusTotal, highlighting the difficulty traditional security tools face in identifying such threats. ### Detection and Prevention #### Implementing Robust Security Measures Financial institutions should adhere to CISA's recommendations: **Message Authentication Codes:** Require and verify MACs on issuer financial request and response messages. **Chip and PIN Requirements:** Implement chip and PIN authentication for debit and credit cards. **Cryptogram Validation:** Perform authorization response cryptogram validation for chip and PIN transactions.

loading..   16-Oct-2024
loading..   5 min read