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31,000 users were impacted by a data breach incident at Pro Wrestling Tees

Pro Wrestling Tees reveals a data breach incident that exposed credit card numbers along with CVV of 31,000 customers due to malware in their systems...

26-Dec-2021
2 min read

No content available.

Related Articles

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Coinbase

Attackers bypass traditional defenses by weaponizing legitimate services and pre...

Phishing scams are increasingly sophisticated, a new campaign targeting Coinbase users has raised alarms across the cybersecurity and cryptocurrency communities. Unlike conventional phishing attempts that rely on malicious links or fake websites, this attack exploits trusted email infrastructure and psychological manipulation to trick users into surrendering control of their crypto wallets. Posing as a mandatory “wallet migration” notice, the scam leverages Akamai’s SendGrid service to bypass email security protocols, all while distributing attacker-controlled recovery phrases to unsuspecting victims. The incident underscores the evolving tactics of cybercriminals and the urgent need for heightened vigilance in the decentralized finance landscape. ### **Attack Landscape** #### **1. Phishing Email** The fraudulent email, sent to thousands of Coinbase users, bore the subject line *“Migrate to Coinbase Wallet”* and claimed the platform was transitioning to self-custodial wallets due to a “court mandate” tied to a fictitious class-action lawsuit. Key elements included: - **False Legal Threat:** The email cited a March 14th deadline for users to migrate their assets, fabricating urgency by alleging regulatory pressure from unregistered securities violations. - **Pre-Generated Recovery Phrase:** Recipients were instructed to set up a new Coinbase Wallet using a 12- or 24-word seed phrase embedded in the email—a phrase already known to attackers. - **Legitimate Links:** All hyperlinks directed users to Coinbase’s official Wallet page, avoiding the red flags typically associated with phishing. #### **2. Exploiting Trusted Infrastructure** The attackers’ use of Akamai’s SendGrid service allowed the email to pass critical security checks: - **SPF, DKIM, and DMARC Compliance:** The email originated from SendGrid IP `167.89.33.244`, resolving to `o1.soha.akamai.com`, which authenticated it as “legitimate” to spam filters. - **Spoofed Sender Domain:** While the email appeared to be from Coinbase, the reply address (`noreply@akamai.com`) and mismatched domain raised subtle but critical red flags. Akamai confirmed an investigation into potential compromises of its SendGrid account, stating, *“We take information security seriously and are actively mitigating risks.”* ### **How Attackers Gain Instant Access** Recovery phrases (or seed phrases) act as cryptographic keys to cryptocurrency wallets. By distributing a pre-generated phrase, the attackers ensured that any wallet created with it would be under their control. Once users transferred funds to the new wallet, attackers could drain assets instantly. - **Authority Bias:** Citing a “court mandate” and regulatory action lent false credibility. - **Urgency:** The March 14th deadline pressured users to act hastily, bypassing critical scrutiny. - **Absence of Obvious Red Flags:** With no suspicious links, even tech-savvy users could be deceived. Coinbase quickly responded via X (formerly Twitter): *“We will never send you a recovery phrase. Never use a seed phrase provided by others.”* ### **Mitigation Strategies** #### **For Users: Immediate Action Steps** 1. **Never Use Third-Party Recovery Phrases:** Legitimate services will never email seed phrases. 2. **Verify Sender Details:** Check for domain mismatches (e.g., `akamai.com` vs. `coinbase.com`). 3. **Transfer Funds Immediately:** Victims who imported the attacker’s phrase must move assets to a new wallet with a self-generated seed. #### **Proactive Defense Measures** - **Enhanced Email Authentication:** Crypto platforms should collaborate with email providers like Akamai to flag emails containing seed phrases. - **User Education Campaigns:** Coinbase could deploy in-app alerts, video tutorials, and quizzes to reinforce security best practices. - **Behavioral Monitoring:** Detect unusual activity, such as mass wallet imports from shared seed phrases. This attack signals a dangerous evolution in social engineering: - **From Links to Trusted Infrastructure:** Cybercriminals are pivoting away from easily detected malicious links to abusing legitimate services (e.g., SendGrid). - **Seed Phrase as a Weapon:** The focus shifts from stealing credentials to distributing compromised keys, exploiting users’ lack of cryptographic literacy. Jane Doe, a cybersecurity analyst at Chainalysis, warns, *_“As crypto adoption grows, attackers will continue targeting the weakest link: human psychology. Education is the first line of defense.”_* The Coinbase phishing scam is a stark reminder of the ingenuity of modern cybercriminals. Attackers have crafted a nearly undetectable threat by weaponizing trusted email services and exploiting gaps in user knowledge. For the crypto industry, the path forward demands: - **Collaboration:** Platforms, email providers, and regulators must share threat intelligence. - **Innovation:** Develop AI-driven tools to detect anomalous email campaigns. - **Empowerment:** Prioritize user education to foster a security-first mindset.

loading..   17-Mar-2025
loading..   4 min read
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KoSpy

Google Play

North Korean Hackers Infiltrate Google Play with KoSpy Spyware in Targeted Surve...

A cyber-espionage sophistication, state-linked North Korean hackers successfully uploaded Android spyware to Google’s official Play Store, masquerading as benign apps to surveil victims, cybersecurity researchers revealed this week. The campaign, attributed to Pyongyang’s notorious hacking apparatus, underscores the growing audacity of state-sponsored actors in exploiting trusted digital platforms. ### **Discovery: KoSpy’s Stealthy Infiltration** On Wednesday, cybersecurity firm Lookout exposed a long-running espionage operation involving malware dubbed **“KoSpy,”** which it linked to North Korean government hackers with “high confidence.” The spyware, disguised as a “File Manager” app, was hosted on Google Play and third-party store APKPure, marking one of the rare instances of North Korean malware penetrating official app stores. According to Lookout’s [report](http://www.lookout.com/threat-intelligence/article/lookout-discovers-new-spyware-by-north-korean-apt37), at least one KoSpy-laden app reached Google Play, which was downloaded “more than 10 times” before removal. A cached snapshot of the app’s store page, reviewed by [TechCrunch](https://techcrunch.com/2025/03/12/north-korean-government-hackers-snuck-spyware-on-android-app-store/), showed a seemingly innocuous utility tool with no overt signs of malice. Researchers also identified similar apps on APKPure, though the platform claimed it _“did not receive an email”_ from Lookout about the findings. Google swiftly removed the apps and deactivated associated Firebase projects—a cloud database service used by KoSpy to retrieve commands—but declined to comment on whether it agreed with Lookout’s attribution to North Korea. ### **KoSpy’s Alarming Capabilities** KoSpy operates as a potent surveillance tool, harvesting vast swaths of sensitive data from infected devices, including: - **SMS messages** and **call logs** - **Real-time location data** via GPS - **Keystrokes** (capturing passwords and messages) - **Files and folders**, including documents and media - **Wi-Fi network details** and **installed app lists** The malware also enables attackers to record ambient audio, capture photos using the device’s cameras, and take screenshots of active apps—capabilities typically reserved for high-tier spyware like Pegasus. Notably, KoSpy leverages Google’s Firestore, a legitimate cloud service, to dynamically update its configuration, allowing operators to evade detection by blending into routine network traffic. _“The use of Firestore is clever,”_ said Christoph Hebeisen, Lookout’s director of security intelligence research. _“It lets the malware communicate with command servers under the guise of normal Google Cloud activity, making it harder for defenders to spot.”_ ### **Tracing KoSpy to North Korea** Lookout’s attribution to North Korea hinges on multiple technical and strategic factors: 1. **Infrastructure Overlap**: KoSpy’s command-and-control servers and domains were tied to **APT37** and **APT43**, hacking groups long associated with Pyongyang. These groups are best known for cyber-espionage against South Korean targets and global cryptocurrency thefts. 2. **Language and Targeting**: Apps featured Korean-language interfaces and titles, suggesting victims were likely **South Korean residents** or Korean-speaking individuals. 3. **Tactical Consistency**: The operation aligns with North Korea’s dual cyber strategy—bankrolling its regime through crypto heists (e.g., the $1.4B Bybit theft) while conducting espionage to stifle dissent and gather intelligence. _“North Korean actors are uniquely motivated. They’re not just after money; they’re also collecting information to maintain regime stability,”_ said Alemdar Islamoglu, a senior researcher at Lookout. ### **Not a Spray-and-Pray Attack** Despite its presence on public app stores, KoSpy’s low download count suggests a highly targeted operation. Researchers believe victims were lured via spear-phishing or directed to the app through personalized links—a tactic commonly used in state-sponsored espionage. _“This wasn’t about mass infection,”_ Hebeisen explained. _“The goal was to compromise specific individuals, possibly dissidents, defectors, or policymakers, with minimal noise.”_ The incident highlights critical vulnerabilities in app store ecosystems, even as companies like Google tout robust security measures. While Google Play’s automated scanners detected and removed KoSpy post-discovery, its initial approval raises questions about gaps in preemptive vetting. _“The fact that North Korean hackers repeatedly slip into official stores shows how challenging it is to keep up with malicious actors,” said Hebeisen. “They’re agile, well-resourced, and willing to experiment.”_ Third-party stores like APKPure, which lack Google’s scrutiny, remain even riskier. Despite APKPure’s claims of rigorous checks, researchers regularly find malware hosted on such platforms. ### **North Korea’s Cyber Evolution: From Heists to Espionage** While Pyongyang’s hackers are infamous for funding nuclear ambitions through cryptocurrency thefts, KoSpy represents a pivot toward strategic surveillance. Experts speculate the regime may be monitoring defectors and activists abroad, gathering geopolitical intelligence amid escalating tensions with South Korea and the U.S., and testing new tools for future attacks. _“Cyber operations are a low-cost, high-reward tool for North Korea,”_ said Priscilla Moriuchi, a former NSA analyst specializing in East Asian threats. _“They can deny plausibility while achieving multiple financial, political, and military objectives.”_ ### **Protecting Against KoSpy and Similar Threats** Lookout and Google urge users to: 1. **Avoid third-party app stores**. 2. **Scrutinize app permissions**—e.g., why would a file manager need microphone access? 3. **Update devices regularly** to patch vulnerabilities. 4. **Use reputable security software** to detect suspicious activity. Google emphasized that its Play Protect service now blocks known KoSpy variants on devices with Google Play Services enabled. The KoSpy campaign underscores the blurred lines between cybercrime and cyberwarfare, with nation-states exploiting the same tools as criminal gangs. The incident is a stark reminder for app stores that even robust defenses can be outmaneuvered by determined adversaries. As Hebeisen noted, _“The North Koreans aren’t slowing down. If anything, they’re getting better.”_ For users, the lesson is clear: trust, but verify. **This [Threatfeed](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news) was updated to include Google’s statement and APKPure’s response.**

loading..   13-Mar-2025
loading..   5 min read
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Hijack

Cryptojacker

Ransomware and infostealers dominate cybersecurity headlines, a lesser-known men...

While ransomware and infostealers dominate cybersecurity headlines, a stealthier threat—**cryptojacking malware**—has quietly siphoned millions from unsuspecting victims. In a groundbreaking investigation, CyberArk Labs [uncovered](https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/captain-massjacker-sparrow-uncovering-the-malwares-buried-treasure) **MassJacker**, a sophisticated cryptojacking operation linked to over **750,000 unique cryptocurrency wallets** and a single Solana wallet valued at **$300,000**. This deep dive reveals how cybercriminals exploit pirated software portals like **pesktop[.]com** to hijack crypto transactions, evade detection, and amass digital fortunes. ### **From Pirated Software to Crypto Theft** The MassJacker campaign begins on **pesktop[.]com**, a rogue site masquerading as a hub for pirated software. Users downloading "cracked" tools unwittingly execute a multi-stage attack: 1. **Initial Scripts**: A PowerShell script downloads three executables, including **[Amadey](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.amadey)** (a notorious botnet) and two .NET payloads. 2. **Layered Obfuscation**: The 32-bit executable, **[PackerE](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6e4c77942c7e64a1a250349099348a87736feb7c3667cfceec18a3d5364b2d98)**, decrypts a DLL (**PackerD1**) armed with five anti-analysis techniques, from **[JIT Hooking](https://github.com/mandiant/jitm)** to a **custom virtual machine (VM)**. 3. **Final Payload**: [PackerD1](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/48f071994095ffc179beeac7db3c70ef175f8551c6880e4b359b35c4752d4a78?nocache=1) loads **PackerD2**, which injects the MassJacker cryptojacker into **InstalUtil.exe**, a legitimate Windows process. The infection chain’s complexity—spanning PowerShell, .NET obfuscation, and process hollowing—underscores evolving malware tactics to bypass endpoint detection. ![Infection Chain Diagram](https://sb-cms.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/infection_chain_diagram_1ed960db18.png) ***Infection Chain (CyberArk)*** ### **Dark Art of Evasion** **1. JIT Hooking & Metadata Token Swapping** MassJacker’s **PackerD1** employs **JIT (Just-In-Time) Compiler Hooking**, dynamically altering function calls during runtime to thwart static analysis. Researchers observed functions like `StopMapper` being rewritten mid-execution (Figure 2), a technique previously linked to **MassLogger**, a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) tool. Metadata token mapping further obfuscates control flow, redirecting fields to malicious functions (e.g., `ObserverProducer`). **2. Custom Virtual Machine & String Obfuscation** The third resource in PackerD1 deploys a **custom VM** executing two scripts. The first manipulates stack values to alter program behavior, while the second decrypts PackerD1’s fourth resource—a string repository obfuscated with non-readable delimiters (Figure 8). These strings reveal the fifth resource, **PackerD2**, which loads the final payload. **3. Process Injection & Anti-Debugging** PackerD2 deserializes a configuration object (`_Bridge`) to disable security tools like **AMSI** and **ETW**. The payload, **MassJacker**, is injected into `InstalUtil.exe` and deploys infinite debugger-checking loops to resist analysis. ### **Cryptojacking Payload: How MassJacker Steals Your Crypto** MassJacker’s core functionality hinges on **clipboard hijacking**: - **Regex Surveillance**: Monitors clipboard activity for crypto addresses (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, etc.). - **Wallet Replacement**: Swaps legitimate wallet IDs with attacker-controlled addresses from encrypted **recovery.dat** and **recoverysol.dat** files. - **C2 Infrastructure**: Downloads updated wallet lists from Command-and-Control servers, ensuring fresh addresses evade blocklists. ### **$300K Solana Heist: Following the Money Trail** CyberArk’s analysis uncovered **778,531 unique wallets**, but only 423 held funds. Key findings include: - **Motherlode Wallet**: Solana address `CJpe4dUcV5Knc2XZKTVsTNHm2MpmJGJNWCJdkfbNdYF5` held **600 SOL ($87,000)** and historically transacted **2,075 SOL ($300,000)**, including NFT trades (Figure 12). - **Cross-Chain Laundering**: Litecoin wallet `ltc1qcvt96u7ul76ha5m3rmy9ajn00avfkmsqpcfpsh` aggregated funds from multiple campaigns, suggesting centralized profit consolidation. - **Victim Testimonies**: Twitter users (e.g., @Achraf_yhy) reported funds siphoned to MassJacker wallets, linking the malware to real-world thefts. ### **Why Cryptojacking Remains Under the Radar** 1. Despite technical sophistication, MassJacker’s direct earnings are modest (~$30,000 after excluding cross-campaign funds). 2. Sandboxes often miss clipboard-focused malware, while static analysis fails to pinpoint cryptojacking intent. 3. Like **Amadey** and **MassLogger**, MassJacker is likely a MaaS tool, fragmenting attribution across threat actors. MassJacker’s discovery illuminates the dark underbelly of cryptojacking—a threat amplified by pirated software traps and evolving anti-analysis tech. For users, vigilance against unofficial downloads is critical. For researchers, decrypting malware like MassJacker offers treasure troves of threat intel, potentially unmasking criminal empires.

loading..   11-Mar-2025
loading..   4 min read