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Data Breach

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2.9 Million Sensitive Records of BSNL Users Reportedly COMPROMISED

Alleged BSNL data breach exposes 2.9 million sensitive records.

23-Dec-2023
4 min read

No content available.

Related Articles

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UK

A coordinated ransomware attack has disrupted IT systems for at least eight loca...

A significant, coordinated cyberattack has targeted the shared IT infrastructure of at least eight London boroughs, severely degrading public services. The incident is identified as a ransomware campaign, impacting systems managed under a common provider model. National cybersecurity authorities are engaged in a critical response operation. #### **Operational Impact Analysis** The attack vector follows a classic ransomware payload deployment, but its impact is magnified due to the centralized infrastructure model. | Impact Area | Technical Manifestation | Service-Level Consequence | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **Core Infrastructure** | Widespread encryption of data assets across shared servers and databases. | Systemic outage of primary business applications and citizen portals. | | **Communication Channels** | Email server clusters and VoIP systems taken offline as a containment measure. | Severely hampered internal coordination and public communication. | | **Citizen Services** | Housing repair platforms, benefits processing systems (Housing Benefit, Council Tax Support), and planning application portals rendered inoperative. | Halting of critical financial support services and statutory functions. | | **Data Exfiltration** | **UNCONFIRMED.** Standard investigative procedure is to assess for Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) related to data theft, a common double-extortion tactic. | Potential for significant data breach, elevating risk beyond operational disruption to long-term privacy concerns. | #### **Attack Vector Analysis** The threat actors exploited the **single points of failure** inherent in the shared-services model provided by **London Councils**. * **Attack Method:** Ransomware Deployment. * **Leveraged Vulnerability:** The compromise of a centralized IT provider created a cascading failure, simultaneously impacting all connected boroughs. This is a textbook example of a **software supply chain attack** within a public sector context. * **Tactical Assessment:** The scale and coordination suggest a sophisticated actor targeting a high-value, multi-tenant environment to maximize disruption and potential ransom leverage. #### **Incident Response** The response has been escalated to the national level, indicating the severity of the incident. * **Activated Agencies:** National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and National Crime Agency (NCA). * **Containment Measures:** Isolation of affected networks and failover to manual, paper-based processes for critical services. * **Strategic Implications:** 1. **Public Sector Cyber Resilience:** This event critically questions the risk-benefit analysis of centralized IT models for essential services without isolated, redundant fail-safes. 2. **Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) Blur:** Attacks on local government, which manages housing and welfare, demonstrate how non-traditional CNI is becoming a primary target for destabilization. 3. **The "To Pay or Not To Pay" Dilemma:** The potential for large-scale exfiltration of citizen data places immense pressure on authorities, balancing immediate recovery against the precedent of funding criminal enterprises. This incident transcends a typical IT outage; it is a systemic failure of a critical public service platform. The restoration of services is the immediate priority. Still, the long-term consequences will involve a mandatory, thorough post-incident review of shared service security architectures, data governance policies, and incident response playbooks across the entire UK public sector.

loading..   27-Nov-2025
loading..   3 min read
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SitusAMC

Data breach at SitusAMC, a financial services vendor, exposed homeowner and empl...

For millions of Americans, their mortgage is a deeply personal, often stressful, cornerstone of their financial life. They deal with their bank, make their payments, and trust that the complex machinery behind the scenes is secure. That trust was fractured earlier this year when SitusAMC, a powerhouse in the commercial and residential real estate finance industry, announced it had been the victim of a massive ransomware attack that exposed the sensitive data of over 1.5 million individuals. But the breach of SitusAMC is more than just another entry in the long list of corporate cyberattacks. A deeper investigation reveals a story of critical contextual nuances: it’s a breach not of a consumer-facing company, but of a critical, invisible linchpin in the financial system; an attack that highlights the profound risks of third-party service providers; and an event whose fallout lands disproportionately on individuals who never knew the company's name. **The "Invisible" Target with a Treasure Trove of Data** Unlike a breach at a retailer or a social media platform, SitusAMC operates deep in the background. Most consumers have never heard of them, yet the company provides "servicing" and "sub-servicing" for a vast portfolio of mortgages. This means they are responsible for the administrative backbone of loans—processing payments, managing escrow accounts, handling foreclosures, and, crucially, storing the immense volumes of documentation required by these processes. _"This is the critical nuance that makes this breach so severe,"_ explains Dr. Aris Thorne, a cybersecurity professor at Georgetown University. "SitusAMC is what's known as a 'target-rich environment.' They don't just have one type of data; they have *all* of it. For a single individual, an attacker could potentially get their Social Security number, mortgage application, tax returns, credit history, bank account details, and driver's license copy—all from one place. It's a one-stop shop for identity theft." The attackers, the notorious ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware cartel, knew exactly what they were targeting. They didn't just lock files; they exfiltrated over 2 terabytes of data, holding it for ransom with the threat of releasing it onto the dark web. **When a "Vendor" Breach Becomes "Your" Breach** The second critical nuance lies in the chain of responsibility. Many of the affected individuals did not have a direct relationship with SitusAMC. Their loan was with a local bank or a major lender, which had contracted SitusAMC to handle the back-office work. "This creates a confusing and fragmented response for the victim," says Maria Flores, a consumer advocate with the National Fair Housing Alliance. "You get a letter from a company you've never heard of, about a loan you have with your bank. It erodes trust and creates immense confusion. Who is ultimately responsible? Your bank will often point to the vendor, and the vendor points to the fact that they are acting on the bank's behalf. The consumer is left in the middle." This "supply chain" attack vector is a growing nightmare for regulators. The breach didn't happen at the point of sale (the bank), but at a critical support node. It underscores a harsh reality: a company's cybersecurity is only as strong as the weakest link in its extended network of partners and vendors. **A Legacy of Vulnerability** The data exposed isn't just current information. The breach includes data from "former homeowners," a phrase that carries its own heavy weight. "For individuals who went through a foreclosure, a short sale, or even those who simply paid off their loan years ago, this breach reopens old wounds," Flores notes. "Their financial situation may have been precarious during that time, and this data provides a snapshot of their most vulnerable moment. To have that exposed adds a layer of psychological distress to the financial risk." Furthermore, for current homeowners, the breach creates a unique form of anxiety. The theft of ongoing mortgage and financial account information means the threat isn't just about a new credit card being opened fraudulently; it's about the potential for sophisticated fraud targeting their largest asset—their home. **A Tepid Response in a High-Stakes Environment** SitusAMC's response, while following standard protocol, has been criticized for not matching the severity of the exposed data. The offer of 24 months of credit monitoring, while standard, is seen by experts as a band-aid on a gaping wound. "Credit monitoring is reactive; it tells you *after* something bad has happened," says Dr. Thorne. "With the depth of information stolen—including SSNs and driver's licenses—the threat of identity theft is lifelong. The criminals can sit on this data for years before using it. Two years of monitoring is insufficient for a breach of this sensitivity." The incident has prompted calls for stricter regulations governing third-party vendors in the financial sector and for mandatory, long-term identity restoration services, rather than temporary monitoring, in cases involving core identity documents. As the investigation continues and lawsuits mount, the SitusAMC breach serves as a stark lesson. It’s a reminder that in our interconnected financial ecosystem, risk is not always visible, and trust in one company often means implicit trust in a dozen others behind the curtain. For the millions affected, the event is a jarring introduction to a company they never knew held the keys to their financial identity.

loading..   26-Nov-2025
loading..   5 min read
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Scattered Lapsus$

Google reveals a catastrophic supply-chain breach: 200+ companies hacked through...

Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has confirmed a catastrophic supply chain attack with a staggering initial scope: data stolen from over 200 companies. The breach vector? Compromised applications from **Gainsight**, a customer success platform, published on the **[Salesforce](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/inside-the-billion-record-extortion-blitz-hitting-salesforce-tenants)** ecosystem. But this is far more than a single incident. This is the latest, highly sophisticated maneuver in a sustained campaign by the threat collective **UNC6240** (tracked by Google), also known as **"_[Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/lapsus-hackers-elevate-sim-swapping-attacks-to-unprecedented-heights)."_** This group, which includes members of the infamous **ShinyHunters**, is systematically targeting the very connective tissue of the modern enterprise: the trusted integrations between SaaS platforms. ## **Deconstructing Attack Chain - A Timeline of Trust Exploited** The attack demonstrates a chilling understanding of the modern cloud environment. This was not a smash-and-grab; it was a patient, multi-stage operation. | Phase | Tactic & Technique | Context & Insight | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **1. Initial Access** | **Compromise of [Gainsight](http://gainsight.com/security/) (c. August 2025)** | The group first breached Gainsight's internal systems nearly three months ago. They allegedly gained this initial foothold through a **prior, identical attack on the Salesloft Drift application**. This indicates a **software supply chain cascade**—one breached vendor becomes the stepping stone to the next. | | **2. Persistence & Weaponization** | **Modification of Legitimate Apps** | From within Gainsight's environment, the actors targeted the company's legitimate applications on the Salesforce AppExchange. By compromising these apps, they turned a tool of business operations into a weapon. | | **3. Lateral Movement & Privilege Escalation** | **Abusing OAuth and Trust Relationships** | When a company installs a Gainsight app, it grants the app certain permissions (OAuth tokens) to access Salesforce data. The attackers inherited these permissions. The critical failure? Many companies had granted these apps **excessive, broad-ranging data access (e.g., "Read/Write All")**, far beyond what was necessary for their function. | | **4. Data Exfiltration** | **API-Based Data Harvesting** | Using the compromised apps' legitimate access, the attackers performed automated, large-scale data queries and exports via Salesforce APIs. Because this traffic came from a trusted, whitelisted source, it was incredibly difficult to distinguish from legitimate business activity. | > **Technical Insight:** _"This attack completely bypasses traditional network security controls,"_ [explains](https://status.salesforce.com/generalmessages/20000233) a senior security engineer at a affected firm (who spoke on condition of anonymity). _"The traffic never hits your firewall. It's a trusted entity inside your perimeter, making authorized API calls to your most sensitive data repository. Your SIEM might see it, but without extremely granular behavioral baselines, it just looks like business as usual."_ ## **UNC6240 & "Scattered Lapsus$" Playbook** Understanding the "who" is key to understanding the "why." UNC6240 is not a typical nation-state actor. Their profile points to a financially motivated cybercrime group with a distinct modus operandi, heavily inspired by the original Lapsus$ group. **Key Adversary Characteristics:** * **Motivation:** **Financial Gain**. Their end goal is likely to extort the victim companies, sell the stolen data on dark web forums, or both. * **Tactics:** **Social Engineering & MFA Fatigue**. They are known to use sophisticated phishing and SIM-swapping attacks to compromise employee credentials, often bombarding victims with MFA push notifications until one is accidentally approved. * **Signature:** **Brazen Extortion & Public Shaming**. Like Lapsus$, they publicly name their victims on platforms like Telegram to maximize pressure for ransom payments. Their claims against giants like **CrowdStrike, DocuSign, GitLab, and LinkedIn** fit this pattern perfectly. * **Strategic Focus:** **Software Supply Chains**. They are repeatedly targeting B2B SaaS providers (such as Gainsight and Salesloft) to amplify the impact of their attacks. ## **Not an Isolated Event** To view the Gainsight breach in isolation is to miss the entire story. It is the second central act in a play that began months ago. * **The Precedent: The Salesloft/Drift Breach (August 2025):** The exact same threat actors executed a nearly identical attack through Salesloft's Drift application. **Gainsight was itself a victim of that earlier breach**, which provided the springboard for this current, wider attack. * **The Pattern:** This campaign reveals a deliberate strategy: identify widely used SaaS platforms that have high-level integrations with other critical systems, compromise one, and use it to attack its entire customer base. The attack surface is not a company's own infrastructure, but its web of trusted partners. ## **Moving Beyond "Check the Box" Security** The standard advice of "patch your systems" is meaningless here. The defense requires a fundamental shift in strategy. **Immediate Actions (This Week):** 1. **Conduct a Brutal Third-Party App Audit:** In your Salesforce, M365, Slack, and Snowflake environments, review every connected application. **Immediately revoke access for any that are non-essential or unfamiliar.** Do not delay. 2. **Scrutinize API Logs for Anomalies:** Look for patterns of data access that are abnormal in volume, frequency, or timing. Focus on large data queries and exports, especially from service accounts associated with third-party apps. **Strategic Shifts (Long-Term):** 1. **Embrace Zero Trust for SaaS Integrations:** Apply the principle of **"Least Privilege Access"** ruthlessly. An app like Gainsight, used for customer analytics, should never have blanket "Read All" permissions. Its access should be scoped to specific data objects and fields only. 2. **Implement a CASB or SSPM:** A **Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB)** or **SaaS Security Posture Management (SSPM)** tool can automatically discover shadow IT, enforce security policies on sanctioned apps, and detect anomalous activity across your cloud portfolio. 3. **Assume Breach, Even with Vendors:** Your security model must now account for the compromise of your most trusted vendors. Segment data access, encrypt sensitive fields, and have an incident response plan that includes a "third-party vendor breach" scenario. ### **End of Innocence in the Interconnected Cloud** The Gainsight breach is a watershed moment. It proves that the efficiency and connectivity of the modern SaaS ecosystem have created a systemic risk that we are only beginning to quantify. The perimeter is no longer your network; it's the sum of all permissions you've granted to every third-party application. The attack surface is no longer your public IP range; it’s the entire OAuth token chain across your digital supply chain. This incident is a call to action for CISOs and security teams everywhere: **The era of trusting third-party integrations by default is over. The era of verified, minimal, and continuously monitored access has begun.** ***This is a developing incident. Follow for ongoing technical analysis as more details from forensic investigations become available.***

loading..   24-Nov-2025
loading..   6 min read